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*Max Deutscher's Genre of Philosophy*

### ABSTRACT

Max Deutscher has explored questions in the philosophy of mind, linked with ethics and political philosophy. He originally studied analytic philosophy with Gilbert Ryle, then focussed on Jean-Paul Sartre and other phenomenological thinkers to explore questions about the nature of the other. In this paper, I explore some of the central themes and motifs in Max Deutscher's work, concentrating on conceptions of community and our relation with the other in his reading of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (2003), and noting how a love of the arts informs his approach to philosophy. My interest is in what makes his work distinctive from that of other philosophers, and after providing a context for reading his work, I will concentrate on one example from his book *Genre and Void: Looking back at Sartre and Beauvoir* (2003) to make the abstract discussion of genre more concrete.

### BIOGRAPHY

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## MAX DEUTSCHER'S GENRE OF PHILOSOPHY<sup>i</sup>

Early in his career, Max Deutscher started to explore questions in the philosophy of mind, linked with ethics and political philosophy, which continue to interest him. There is a great deal of continuity in his work, and he continues to engage with the thought of one of his early teachers, Gilbert Ryle. Max Deutscher originally studied analytic philosophy, yet he found the analytic approach to the questions that interested him too 'thin' and too 'cheerful', as he says in a recent radio interview with Alan Saunders.<sup>ii</sup> So instead he turned to Sartre and other phenomenological thinkers to explore questions about the nature of the other and the sense of disquiet one feels in being observed by someone else. This early reading, as well as Ryle's work, informs *Subjecting and Objecting* (1983) his discussion of Beauvoir and Sartre in *Genre and Void: Looking back at Sartre and Beauvoir* (2003), *Judgement after Arendt* (2007) and his writing on Michèle Le Dœuff's work. In this paper, I explore some of the central themes and motifs in Max Deutscher's texts, focussing on conceptions of community and our relation with the other in his reading of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, and noting how a love of the arts informs his approach to philosophy. I am taking this approach to demonstrate how Max Deutscher, in using an original literary style and focussing on examples in his readings of other philosophers, creates a particular genre of philosophy. My interest is in what makes his approach distinctive from that of other philosophers, and after providing a context for reading his work, I will concentrate on one example from his book *Genre and Void* to make the abstract discussion of genre more concrete.

In Max Deutscher's thinking, the content is inseparable from his concern with style. Indeed, in *Subjecting and Objecting* he mentions Susan Sontag as an inspiration. This link with the arts, especially music and poetry, is one that emerges in many places in his writing. I will mention a few examples that show how eclectic and also humorous Max Deutscher's use of references from the arts are. In the same book we find a quote from the Beatles: 'A man's a fool who keeps his cool, by making his world a little colder.'<sup>iii</sup> On that page he refers to Beethoven, Mozart and Stockhausen, to recommend that we try reading contemporary philosophers. Pink Floyd also garners a quotation, apropos of our response to injustice: 'after everything is said and done, we are just ordinary men.'<sup>iv</sup> In *Genre and Void* Max Deutscher remarks that 'Hamlet, Odysseus, Emma, scrutinise my ideas and outlook,'<sup>v</sup> and writes 'Sartre is the Hamlet of "Oh! That this too too solid flesh would melt,/ thaw and resolve itself into a dew".'<sup>vi</sup> Other artists referred to include Keats, Longfellow, Virginia Woolf, Joan Baez, Leonard Cohen, Bob Dylan, Tom Stoppard, Jimi Hendrix (*Are You Experienced*), Cat Stevens, and Sartre's 'Other' is compared to the Scarlet Pimpernel.<sup>vii</sup> This is not to mention Max Deutscher's extensive discussions of Arendt's own classical references in *Judgement after Arendt*. These references are part of the texture of the everyday that makes his writing so alive and so thought-provoking. Another feature of that texture is the use of vignettes and images from contemporary life.

In *Subjecting and Objecting*, Max Deutscher analyses movements of thought he sees as totalitarian: religion, Marxism, and physicalism; this concern parallels Arendt's concern with totalitarianism as a political phenomenon. He aims to present an account of different forms of objectivity in a range of fields. The terms 'subjecting' and 'objecting,' rather than 'subjective' and 'objective,' are used to suggest their process character in 'thinking, perceiving and acting.'<sup>viii</sup> The examination Max Deutscher undertakes in this book of the qualities and virtues appropriate to objectivity such as confidence and the risks in certain forms of arrogance, vanity and pride is a contribution to social and critical epistemology and prefigures his work on Le Dœuff and Arendt. This is most obvious in the concern with judgement and in the distinction between work and labour, where he writes that 'work is done when a force continues for some time to operate over some distance.'<sup>ix</sup> Labour is where nothing gets done; we are instead 'marching on the spot.'<sup>x</sup>

Max Deutscher practices a rigorous use of personal references in his texts; he is not referring to himself or his life so much as reflecting on what philosophical theories can mean to people, checking them against our experience as a form of 'reality-testing.'<sup>xi</sup> It also provides a re-experience of a philosophical problem in a different key. He notes in *Genre and Void* that he is 'friendly' to contemporary philosophy such as postmodernism and deconstruction, and his approach to authors who have sometimes ignored each other (like Beauvoir and Irigaray) and sometimes criticised each other (Irigaray and Sartre, Le Dœuff and Irigaray) is a friendly one. Hannah Arendt's idea of companions in thought, where we gain ideas of what is right and wrong through who we choose to think with, is exemplified throughout Max Deutscher's reading of their work.<sup>xii</sup> Equal to our looking back at Beauvoir and Sartre, he points out, is their looking back at us.

### GENRE AND VOID

In *Genre and Void*, Max Deutscher reads Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre's work alongside that of Michèle Le Dœuff and Luce Irigaray. Reading these philosophers together, he engages with a range of pressing

philosophical questions and develops further the potential in Sartre and Beauvoir's texts. It has been said often that Sartre has no theory of oppression and that Beauvoir provides this theory. *Genre and Void* demonstrates how there are insights to be gained concerning the nature of oppression through Sartre's conceptions of freedom and of community and solidarity.<sup>xiii</sup> Our attention is drawn to Sartre's contribution in this regard as well as making us more aware of Beauvoir and Irigaray's supplements. Max Deutscher argues that there are lumps in *Being and Nothingness* that need deconstruction and elaboration—inconsistencies in his view of knowledge and the body and in his sexually biased 'perceptions, theory, and language.'<sup>xiv</sup> Nevertheless, he also demonstrates the relevance of Sartre's insights into political questions, particularly concerning freedom and responsibility.

Max Deutscher writes that "The reader, "observer" of the philosophical writer, appraises in their own terms not only what that "lover of wisdom" says, but what they were *doing* in writing what they did."<sup>xv</sup> *Genre and Void* gives Sartre credit for drawing our attention to the oppressiveness of such situations as that of a woman whose hand is unexpectedly held by a man affecting to conduct an intellectual conversation.<sup>xvi</sup> In response, the woman dissociates herself from her hand and treats it as a 'thing.' Of course, Sartre does not analyse the oppressiveness of the situation but rather attributes bad faith to the uncomfortable woman. In his discussion of this famous 'couple in a café' example, Max Deutscher updates it and imagines Sartre talking about it in 2002. These updates and relocations of Sartre's so-Parisian and so-forties examples demonstrate how by returning to Sartre and reworking his cases, we can gain a greater understanding of phenomenology in general and the particular experience evoked. The time-travelling Sartre admits that when a couple 'do lunch' in Sydney in 2002, a woman could take a man's hand and he could refuse to acknowledge the move.<sup>xvii</sup> The time-travelling Sartre could imagine that roles are reversed or at least that the power can shift in particular cases. Not only women can experience the 'frozen' hand and not only women are in bad faith.

Apropos of this kind of example, one of the reviewers of *Genre and Void* claims that the characters of *Being and Nothingness* would never have gone surfing, as they "belong in the cafés of Saint-Germain-des-Prés."<sup>xviii</sup> Yet this is to completely miss the point of the transpositions that Max Deutscher makes, particularly in *Genre and Void*. First, *Being and Nothingness* is a work of philosophy, where the descriptions of scenes in cafés are supposed to be of more general relevance. By taking some of these scenes to Sydney in the twenty-first century, Max Deutscher is taking them seriously as philosophy and seeing whether they really have the phenomenological insight they purport to have.

While Max Deutscher criticises both Sartre and Beauvoir as being too individualistic,<sup>xix</sup> he censures Sartre particularly for lending 'unequal weight to women and to men as he differs *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*.'<sup>xx</sup> As he says, Beauvoir adds the categories of power and economy, and the subtle details of oppression, to Sartre's categories in *Being and Nothingness*.<sup>xxi</sup> Another expression used is that Sartre has not fully 'played out the hand that he and Beauvoir hold between them.'<sup>xxii</sup> The hand that they hold is not the 'frozen' hand of the woman in the café, but the hand of cards that is the potential of phenomenological description. Sartre's analyses need the generosity that Beauvoir evokes, as well as sensitivity to sexually and culturally marked experience.

Max Deutscher does not see the same kind of inconsistencies and sexual bias in *The Second Sex*. In his view, there is more room to manoeuvre in Beauvoir's text concerning relations with others, whereas we feel 'angrily trapped' in Sartre's text.<sup>xxiii</sup> Putting this remark together with the idea that we have to see what a text is doing, it is fascinating that a text concerning absolute freedom makes us feel trapped, whereas Beauvoir's text on oppression makes us feel the possibilities of freedom. Beauvoir also articulates the possibility of reciprocity, where each regards the other as subject and object.<sup>xxiv</sup> However, Max Deutscher clearly sees it as important to engage with Sartre's work and believes that *Being and Nothingness* contains political insights as well as metaphysical ones.

## FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION

In *Genre and Void*, one of the faults exposed in Sartre's text is the lack of a full understanding of the mechanisms of power. For example, in Sartre's description of the waiter in bad faith, Sartre 'does not take into account that his boss, who can sack his employee for not acting his part, is party to this play.'<sup>xxv</sup> Max Deutscher observes that Beauvoir used Sartre's idea that victims of oppression may be in bad faith in consenting to their situation, but that she differs from Sartre in accepting that sometimes the victim is not responsible for their situation.

On the one hand, Max Deutscher is quite critical of Sartre's conceptions of freedom and oppression, believing that he overlooks the possibility that victims of oppression can lose the 'power of choice' altogether, not just this or that freedom.<sup>xxvi</sup> He seems to accept Michèle Le Dœuff's criticisms of Sartre that he makes freedom a terrible

burden we have to endure.<sup>xxvii</sup> In his discussion of nothingness, he also objects to Sartre's description of the worker as suffering from oppression and not knowing what to do.<sup>xxviii</sup> Sartre says that the worker of 1830 'does not represent his sufferings to himself as unbearable; he adapts himself to them not through resignation but because he lacks the education and reflection necessary for him to conceive of a social state in which these sufferings would not exist.'<sup>xxix</sup> While this may be a good account of the worker's situation, Max Deutscher believes that Sartre offers an excuse that should not be available in terms of his theory. Absolute freedom should apply to the worker of 1830 just as it applies to the woman in the café.

Like Debra Bergoffen's reading of Beauvoir that sees another Beauvoir in a muted voice, Max Deutscher can also hear 'a different tone of voice that is in sympathy with the oppressed.'<sup>xxx, xxxi</sup> He is attuned to this other sound in Sartre's work. While Sartre's claim to absolute freedom can appear to condemn the oppressed for their own condition, it is more sympathetically read by Max Deutscher as an implicit appeal to us all to remember that we can act against injustice or at least that we must never give up the hope of the possibility of acting even when it seems that the power of choice is lost. This call is one we can relate to when we blame ourselves for past inaction or feel helpless in the face of seemingly inexorable political events. The example given here is that of a group of women who were discussing on a radio programme how they had to give up their new-born children when they were teenagers. They felt absolutely powerless at the time but looking back they wondered why they did not simply leave with their baby.<sup>xxxii</sup> If we could feel our freedom in such situations we could act against injustice.

Furthermore, Max Deutscher sees significant potential for solidarity in the relation between freedom and responsibility, declaring '*Freedom* regains nobility in appealing to empathy with *oppressed peoples ... Freedom entails responsibility* sounds a call to those with power—not a threat of further burdens laid upon those already deprived.'<sup>xxxiii</sup> He develops and extends these insights by pointing out the phenomena of a common attribution of freedom to the least powerful when those in power want to blame the victim, as well as a tendency of the powerful to deny power when they wish to deny responsibility for what they doing to the victim.<sup>xxxiv</sup> In addition to these significant injunctions and observations, Sartrean theory contributes to an understanding of the experience of community and solidarity.

### BEING-WITH OR THE *MITSEIN*

The final section of *Genre and Void* is entitled 'Lost in La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle.' La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle is a Paris *Métro* station not far from the Eiffel Tower and the setting for Sartre's description of the experience of the 'we-subject.' As is well-known, Sartre maintains that 'The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein*; it is conflict.'<sup>xxxv</sup> Yet he realises there are experiences where we feel ourselves to be part of a group. In his account of group formation, Sartre distinguishes between the 'Us-object' and the 'We-subject'. The 'Us-object' reveals an actual feature of being based on our recognition of our for-others, such as an experience of a common shame or class consciousness. The 'We-subject', he believes, is an ephemeral psychological experience in a particular economic system, such as in the marching of soldiers or a crew working on a boat.<sup>xxxvi</sup> The we-subject is parallel to 'being-in-the-act-of-looking' and the 'us-object' is parallel to 'being-looked-at.'<sup>xxxvii</sup> What this distinction suggests is that being looked at by others is a more fundamental experience than our feeling part of a group or community.

This trip through the *Métro* is read alongside Irigaray's exploration of our relation to the other. Irigaray's book *To be Two* demonstrates the importance of phenomenological description to the development of her ethical and political ideals and in several essays she discusses Sartre's work concerning relations with others. Max Deutscher finds an 'apprehensive mood' in Sartre's account of our intersubjective relations that contrasts with Irigaray's recommendation of wonder as a response to others: 'Sartre describes a destruction of morale as intrinsic to one's being the object of regard. In contrast, Irigaray conveys the pleasure and enlargement of mind of finding oneself in a world with beings and dimensions beyond one's own.'<sup>xxxviii</sup> His interpretation is that Sartre sees others as imposing their values on me even in admiration. I believe that Irigaray is also concerned about this problem, being critical of worship of women together with the denigration of women, which is why she focuses on the passion of wonder in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*.<sup>xxxix</sup> Max Deutscher would agree that both philosophers believe we have to face the loss of our perfect dominance of the world, but he sees Irigaray's responsive mood as mourning and Sartre's as anxiety and terror.

Their different understandings are played out through their interpretations of the experience of walking between *Métro* stations. Thus, for Sartre, 'if I change routes at La-Motte-Picquet, I am the "They" who change ... My immediate ends are the ends of the "They", and I apprehend myself as interchangeable with any one of my neighbours.'<sup>xl</sup> My project is the same as the project of the other *Métro*-riders. However, he argues that this

experience is a psychological rather than ontological one that arises from a shared rhythm and is not primary because it is based on more primary attitudes that recognise the existence of others and of ourselves as members of the human species. One can have this experience in contemporary Paris or indeed anywhere that one becomes part of the rhythm of a group. Sartre says that we experience ourselves as we-subjects in relation to all manufactured objects, in our professional and technical roles and whenever we are part of a group of spectators.<sup>xli</sup>

Sartre's points are challenged by Irigaray, who claims that 'I am not reduced to an "any body" in the corridor of the subway station at La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle if I walk towards you' and that my interiority is protected.<sup>xlii</sup> She says there are three reasons our interiority is protected: because

I am sexuete, I am not neuter, anonymous or interchangeable; I am animated by my intentions towards the other, in particular towards you, and not simply determined by the world which surrounds me; I am a mystery for you, as you are for me, and our intersubjectivity is protected from the imperative originating in the exterior world and in the anonymity of its destination addressed to an "anybody".<sup>xliii, xliv</sup>

While Max Deutscher notes that there are points of agreement between Irigaray and Sartre, such as the idea of an 'us' relying on a third party, and that the 'we' is only bonded in anonymous labour or participation, he sees Irigaray as emphasising intimacy and interiority.<sup>xlv</sup>

Nonetheless, it should be recalled that Sartre is not saying that we completely lose ourselves in the *Métro*, noting that 'I differentiate myself by each use of the subway as much by the individual upsurge of my being as by the distant ends I pursue' and, as mentioned, says that this experience is not primary.<sup>xlvi</sup> Here I do not see an experience of terror or anxiety but a pleasurable anonymity in being one of the crowd, part of a rhythm, and enjoying the *Métro*. Sartre's characterisation does not preclude thought, nor does it preclude that we could have an encounter with a particular other, a *toi* that I relate to. If I walk towards you then I can respond to you.

Irigaray is famous for 'romancing' philosophers such as Lévinas, Descartes, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. One of the reasons Irigaray has romanced Sartre must be, as Max Deutscher says, because

It is as if Sartre has come *so close* to a solution. He describes the conundrums of human desire and shows how they arise from fantasies, but, insisting on desire as possession, his own account of relations between people spins out into space. He responds to difference in terms of his philosophical project that declares each person 'absurd' and yet inextinguishable. What he lacks is a phenomenology of *desiring the other in their difference*.<sup>xlvii</sup>

Thus, Sartre's phenomenology is missing a crucial element of an acceptance of the irreducible difference of the other.

Irigaray's primary criticism of Sartre is that his account of our sense of community comes through external relations rather than from the recognition of the singularity of myself and others.<sup>xlviii</sup> How Max Deutscher reads Irigaray is that her narrator is rescued by meeting someone she knows. Of course, as he notes, Sartre's narrator could also meet someone he knows, but such an encounter would be a negative, conflictual one and he might prefer to remain in anonymity. Max Deutscher argues that we see the limits of dialogue in Sartre's account of the experience of 'we-subjects.' The problem with dialogue, he believes, is that it is 'too bland to cure the lack of any eruption of individual feeling. I could share my "dialogue" with any stranger as *'I insert myself in the great human stream which ... has flowed incessantly.'*<sup>xlix</sup> The suggestion here appears to be that Sartre does not individuate sufficiently for there to be genuine dialogue and in any case dialogue cannot address the deep questions of sexual and other differences.

While I find the fundamental criticism of Sartre as overemphasising conflict in relations with the Other a fair one, I would like to ask what the meaning of Sartre's characterisation of the crowd is and how it might contribute to our understanding of community. Perhaps Irigaray has not romanced Sartre, but has rather demonised him. One could partly defend Sartre on the grounds that his account of being in the crowd is only one aspect of forming communities, which we do through shared activities and through being viewed by others (the us-object). It is a partial account of certain situations rather than a full account of group formation.<sup>1</sup> A second point is that one can read his account as a description of a non-ideal community that can be contrasted with Irigaray's account of a future ideal community. *Being and Nothingness* is not an attempt to argue for a utopia but a description of our world. Irigaray's expression 'I am a mystery for you as you are for me' elides that difference. Certainly, Sartre can be faulted even on that reading; nevertheless we could see more in La Motte-Picquet-Grenelle than a loss of interiority.

The *Métro* example contains the seeds of an account of social movements and groups.<sup>li</sup> On Sartre's account, oppressed groups are constituted by the look of the 'They' who see us as objects. Sartre explains that this experience is a fleeting and unstable one, and cautions against assuming that the 'They', the third or oppressing class, form a stable 'we'.<sup>lii</sup> Rather, the bourgeois, for example, is weak because it does not experience itself as a class at all. As he writes:

The "bourgeois" commonly denies that there are classes; he attributes the existence of a proletariat to the action of agitators, to awkward incidents, to injustices which can be repaired by particular measures; he affirms the existence of a solidarity of interests between capital and labor; he offers instead of class solidarity a larger solidarity, natural solidarity, in which the worker and the employer are integrated in a *Mitsein* which suppresses the conflict.<sup>liii</sup>

Although an obvious response is that such claims by the bourgeois are insincere, Sartre believes that while the bourgeois experience themselves as confronted with a group of 'they-subjects', they will not feel part of a community (an 'us') unless the workers rebel or suddenly gain more power.

We can partially see Beauvoir's and Irigaray's corrections to Sartre as emerging from their development of a more nuanced reading of the structures of power. Sartre's expression of the lack of solidarity between human beings is transposed by Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* in her claim that women never say 'we' whereas other groups do. Max Deutscher gives a sympathetic portrait of her analysis, detailing how she exposes the lack of solidarity between women, and how Beauvoir's 'strategy is neither to deny difference nor to make a thing of it'.<sup>liv</sup> His engagement with Sartre's work in relation to Irigaray's criticisms and Beauvoir's transformations leads us back to think again about community and solidarity.

## READING ARENDT AND LE DŒUFF

The argument of *Genre and Void* is that now, fifty years after they were fêted, we can properly appreciate Beauvoir and Sartre's work. Both philosophers remind us to be open to a range of genres of discourse in philosophy and both philosophers can contribute to contemporary debates about freedom, realism and objectivity.<sup>lv</sup> A refreshing feature of Max Deutscher's approach to Beauvoir and Sartre is that he writes about the two together as philosophers without thinking that the primary question is who influenced whom or who had which idea first but on the fruitfulness of their work.<sup>lvi</sup>

Likewise, in *Judgment after Arendt*, his focus is on the philosophical relationship between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, not the personal one. Unlike many commentators on Heidegger, Max Deutscher observes that Heidegger had the resources to criticise Nazism, the sad thing is he didn't use them.<sup>lvii</sup> In *Judgment after Arendt*, Max Deutscher also draws a number of parallels between Ryle's work and Arendt's in his detailed reading of Arendt's *The Life of the Mind*. For example he writes that 'What Arendt has in common with Ryle is her ability to evoke the phenomena of thinking while refusing dualism's positing of thinking as a process over and above physical activities'.<sup>lviii</sup> He notes that Arendt was working on *The Life of the Mind* at the same time that Ryle was writing eight essays on thinking. Indeed Arendt refers to Ryle in a number of passages in *The Life of the Mind*, to observe her disagreement with him concerning the nature of the will.<sup>lix</sup> *Judgment After Arendt* takes up Arendt's linking of Eichmann's lack of thought with the more general question of the nature of thinking. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, originally published as a series of articles in the *New Yorker*, Arendt details the trial of Adolf Eichmann.<sup>lx</sup> Arendt's confrontation with 'the banality of evil' occurred in Eichmann's trial, a person she sees as a mindless bureaucrat. She noted the thoughtlessness of Eichmann, and considered that thoughtfulness can help to prevent people carrying out evil actions. Arendt was struck by his ordinariness, his apparent lack of hatred for the victims, and his lack of remorse for what he had done. 'Thoughtless' murderers like Eichmann, as she sees it, fail to engage in 'enlarged thought' or to imagine the lives of their victims at all. In order to understand this lack in Eichmann, she needs to explore the activity of thinking. For Max Deutscher, thinking is a certain way of being alive.<sup>lxi</sup> He appreciates Arendt's metaphor of thinking as a kind of conversation with oneself, and also takes seriously Arendt's view that philosophy and the philosopher's role is to disturb us, and to disrupt taken-for-granted meanings rather than to provide us with familiar truths.

Finally, Max Deutscher has written many essays on Michèle Le Dœuff's work and contributed to her reception by translating and discussing some of her essays not published in English, especially her work on Shakespeare. He addresses her concept of the subject, or rather approach to treating the subject in partial ways by drawing on a range of discourses. This approach involves undoing or revealing the risks in any theory of the subject—the tendency toward positing an absolute or universal subject, or giving a metaphysical theory or even positing

consciousness as mystery.<sup>lxii</sup> Max Deutscher also discusses Le Dœuff's account of utopias, drawing out from her work our ambivalence to them. He writes in "Utopias and Dreams" that "The "hidden truth" of a Utopia may be not that it is a better society for the future, but that our own "State" is already a failed form of it. Thus the Utopia leads us back into a myth of our ideals as once realised more perfectly—in our origins."<sup>lxiii</sup> Utopias remind us of what we would have hoped to experience rather than the recent failure of political theories we have experienced. In this way, Max Deutscher connects utopian writing with twentieth century events and celebrates their potential for hope in the future. While he is happy to disturb us, he also leaves room for optimism as he creates a genre in philosophy.

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## REFERENCES

- <sup>i</sup> My thanks go to Max Deutscher and the other members of the panel for their contributions, to an anonymous reviewer for comments and to Daniel Nicholls for his judicious editing.
- <sup>ii</sup> Alan Saunders, "The Great Divide: Interview with Max Deutscher," *Philosopher's Zone*, ABC Radio National (13<sup>th</sup> October, 2007).
- <sup>iii</sup> Max Deutscher, *Subjecting and Objecting*, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 253.
- <sup>iv</sup> *Ibid.*, 267.
- <sup>v</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void: Looking Back at Sartre and Beauvoir* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 165.
- <sup>vi</sup> *Ibid.*, 148. The reference is to William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, I.2 129–130.
- <sup>vii</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 144.
- <sup>viii</sup> Deutscher, *Subjecting and Objecting*, 4.
- <sup>ix</sup> *Ibid.*, 249.
- <sup>x</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.
- <sup>xi</sup> The rigorous personalism that Max practices in his book is not a reference to the self but a reflection of what philosophical theories can mean to people, such as the story of the little boy being perceived as 'having been sick' by his cousin as an example of the way being looked at makes one feel.
- <sup>xii</sup> Cf. Arendt's discussion of choosing the right company of 'examples of persons dead or alive, real or fictitious,' Hannah Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, Jerome Kohn (Ed.) (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 146.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Sartre discusses oppressed and oppressing classes in the section "'Being-with' (*Mitsein*) and the 'we'" of *Being and Nothingness*. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology*, Hazel Barnes (trans.) (London and New York: Routledge 1996), 413–430.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 171.
- <sup>xv</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.
- <sup>xvi</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.
- <sup>xvii</sup> *Ibid.*, 36–37. See also Michèle Le Dœuff, *Hipparchia's Choice: An essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, etc.*, trans. Trista Selous (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 72–74, and Toril Moi, *Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 127–133.
- <sup>xviii</sup> David Macey, "Fleshing It Out," *Radical Philosophy* 123 (2004): 53.
- <sup>xix</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, xxxi.
- <sup>xx</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.
- <sup>xxi</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.
- <sup>xxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, H.M. Parshley (Ed. and trans.) (London: Penguin, 1983), 172.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, xxiii.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvii.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 435.
- <sup>xxx</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 59.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Bergoffen interprets Beauvoir's 'dominant' voice as one concerned with an ethic of transcendence and the project and her 'muted' voice as one concerned with the concepts of joy, the erotic, generosity and the gift. Debra B. Bergoffen, *The Philosophy of Simone De Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

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- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Ibid., 59.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 429.
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> Ibid., 415.
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 200.
- <sup>xxxix</sup> Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (trans.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13.
- <sup>xl</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 424.
- <sup>xli</sup> Ibid., 426.
- <sup>xlii</sup> Irigaray, *To Be Two*, Monique M. Rhodes and Marco F. Cocito-Monoc (trans.) (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 39. Irigaray also challenges Sartre's neglect of our early relations with our mother in his account of consciousness.
- <sup>xliii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xliv</sup> In a review of Irigaray's book, Penelope Deutscher maintains that Irigaray does not attempt to locate elements in Sartre's text that might conflict with her account. Cf. Penelope Deutscher, "Love Discourses, Sexed Discourses? Luce Irigaray's *Être Deux*," *Continental Philosophy Review* 33 (2000): 113–131.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 205.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 424.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 214.
- <sup>xlviii</sup> Irigaray, *To Be Two*, 39.
- <sup>xlix</sup> Max Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 218.
- <sup>1</sup> Sartre gives his more complete account in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Alan Sheridan-Smith (trans.) (London: Verso, 2004).
- <sup>ii</sup> Sartre's work on the nature of passively experienced groups has been useful in his account of anti-Semitism, his later work on group formation, and in Iris Marion Young's account of gender as seriality. Cf. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate*, George J. Becker (trans.) (New York: Schocken Books, 1995); Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*; Iris Marion Young, 'Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective,' in *Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 12–37.
- <sup>iii</sup> Nik Fox says that Sartre's analysis of solidarity in *Being and Nothingness* is only the beginning of an account and reduces the social to the interpersonal. Cf. Nik Farrell Fox, *The New Sartre: Explorations in Postmodernism* (London: Continuum, 2003), 56.
- <sup>liii</sup> Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 429.
- <sup>liv</sup> Deutscher, *Genre and Void*, 18.
- <sup>lv</sup> Ibid., 254. This diversity of genre is tied to diversity of interpretations of knowledge and understanding.
- <sup>lvi</sup> Max Deutscher does say at one point that Sartre is a bad influence on Beauvoir because of his abstract descriptions of personal themes: 'The ill effect that remains in Beauvoir's writing, all the same is that sexual feelings and conduct emerge in the text only at an impersonal level,' *ibid.*, 187. This notion of the impersonal level needs more explanation, as I find Beauvoir's endless descriptions of varieties sufficiently personal. Perhaps if we want to know more about her as a person we can look to her autobiographies and biographies.
- <sup>lvii</sup> Deutscher, *Judgement After Arendt*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 98.
- <sup>lviii</sup> Ibid., 59.
- <sup>lix</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, Volume 2 (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 4–5.
- <sup>lx</sup> Eichmann was a middle-ranking Nazi who arranged many of the deportations to concentration and extermination camps and was responsible for the deaths of millions. He escaped to Argentina after the war and was captured by Mossad agents and brought to trial in Israel in 1961. He was found guilty and executed in 1962.
- <sup>lxi</sup> Saunders, "Thinking and judging with Hannah Arendt: Interview with Max Deutscher," *Philosopher's Zone* (ABC Radio National, 20<sup>th</sup> October 2007).
- <sup>lxii</sup> Deutscher, (Ed.) *Operative Philosophy and Imaginary Practice: Michèle Le Dœuff* (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2000).
- <sup>lxiii</sup> Deutscher, "Utopias and Dreams," *Australian Journal of French Studies* XL, No. 3 (2003): 295–296.