
This article is Costa Lima’s contribution to a two volume cultural history of the Novel. It is also a useful overview and summary of Costa Lima’s ideas pertaining to the control of the imaginary in relation to the novel at this point in his thinking. Here he looks separately at the themes of the imagination, the novel and control. Regarding the imagination, the discussion ranges from Aristotle, through Dante, to Coleridge. Regarding the novel, the discussion, delimited by matters of control, examines first the ideas of Schlegel and Hegel, and then, more recently, the ideas of Bakhtin and Zumthor. The following section on control is the most succinct summary of this notion since the first of chapter of Control of the Imaginary (1988). Each of these preceding discussions is then brought to bear upon a brief survey of the English novel in the Eighteenth century; here Costa Lima demonstrates ‘control in action’, in such novels as Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Sterne’s Tristram Shandy.

**The Control of the Imagination and the Novel**

An enormous difference in status separates the terms most essential to this essay: imagination, novel, and control. While *imagination*, as a psychic faculty or force whose activation would be considered decisive for the creation of the artistic product from the moment that art was conceived as autonomous, and *novel*, as the dominant literary genre since the eighteenth century, are terms of great legitimacy in literary study, *control* only recently was designated an operative analytic term. Moreover, having been taken up by only a few critics in the meantime, its presence as a theoretical term has been virtually null. This difference underlies the construction of this argument and constitutes its essential difficulties. Given this difference, I will restrict the preliminary presentation of the legitimized terms to the fundamental, in order to articulate more fully the term without status.

**The Imagination in Antiquity and Modernity: From Aristotle to Coleridge**

When and how did Western thought begin to reflect on the imagination? It was initially delineated as a secondary topos in a chapter of Aristotle's *De anima*. Victor Caston demonstrates that the philosopher needed it to show "that the content of mental states can eventually *diverge* from all that is actually in the world." In other words, *fantasy* served to test a theory that sought to demonstrate the existence of psychological error. In line with the theories of his predecessors, Aristotle's theory did not reckon with the criterion of falsifiability. Reduced to its simplest expression, his theory affirmed that *sensation* and conceptual apprehension constituted the base operations, respectively, of perception and of the majority of intentional states. An instrument would be necessary to prove this. Herein lay the vitality of fantasy, for "this other mental state would not be able to be identified either with sensation or with conceptual apprehension, nor would it be able to be understood according to their model: in contrast to what holds true for these two prior states, fantasy and all the states just mentioned (imagination, association, memory, anticipation, reason, deliberation, desire, action, passions, and dreams) can diverge from reality." In Aristotle's own words: "Imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgment without it. . . . For imagining, lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g., we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth."  

Hence Aristotle's immediate task is to demonstrate the different function of fantasy relative to sensation and cognition. Aristotle's basic reasoning in *De anima* is as follows: first, feeling is a faculty or activity, while imagination occurs in the absence of both, like that which occurs in dreams (428a5-8); second, while all moving animals possess sensations, the majority do not know the imagination; third, if sensations are always true, the imagination in most cases is false (428a11-12). Insofar as cognition is concerned: imagination, capable of being false, cannot be confused with cognition or intelligence, which can never be in error (428a17-18). Nor can it be confused with opinion, since opinion supposes belief and, even when animals possess an imaginative capacity, we never find in them any evidence of belief. Hence Aristotle concludes: "It is clear then that the imagination cannot, again, be opinion *plus* sensation, or opinion mediated by sensation, or a blend of opinion and sensation" (428a24-26). For these reasons, "*fantasy* stands midway between these divers faculties. It is more fundamental than the intellectual faculties, extending to the animal kingdom, but it is also susceptible to error. From this vantage point, it functions ideally to explain errors manifest in behavior, even in those animals that are nonrational." 

While we can satisfy ourselves with a schematic tracing of the development of the Aristotelian concept of fantasy, we cannot do without an essential elaboration by the commentator or without commentary on a passage from *De anima* that Caston deems unnecessary. His elaboration still concerns the distinctiveness of imagination in relation to sensation: while sensation promotes a disturbance in which it is felt, the *phantasm*, that is, the product of fantasy, has the character of an echo, thus signifying a deviation from its original stimulus. From this observation the commentator extracts a consequence that deserves more unfolding than I can undertake here: "The causal chain that reconducts it [i.e., the phantasm] to its object is in no way essential, since that which determines the content of a phantasm is not its causal antecedent, but its causal capability; and it can happen that this 'echo' is modified on the path that conducts it to the central organ in a manner that alters its causal capacities." Let me add only that this property of deviating from the causal chain to which sensations are subject gives the product of fantasy a peculiarity that would be developed dramatically once it surpassed the secondary state to which it was relegated by ancient thought. The passage that Caston disdains, in fact, closes Aristotle's chapter on the history of the imagination: "Because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e., the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of thought, others (i.e., men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep" (429a5-8, italics added). It does not matter that the philosopher considers the
imaginative capacity to pertain to other animals, but rather that he affirms that its function, among men, is subordinate to the *temporary eclipse of thought*. As René Lefebvre notes, many centuries would pass before the creative capacity of fantasy would be recognized. As René Lefebvre notes, many centuries would pass before the creative capacity of fantasy would be recognized. In the thinking of antiquity, the imagination is active only by default, when cognition is obscured. Thus, Aristotelian mimesis, while it might not be confounded with imitation, as it would in the Renaissance moment of its rediscovery, would be guided by the parameters of physis, obliging it to be organic.

As proof of the imagination's minor character, subsidiary to the theory that embraced it and subaltern in human activity, there is nothing more indicative than its presence in the poet who, more than anyone else, merged the traditions of antiquity and Christianity. In Dante, as M.W. Bundy aptly points out, the *vis imaginativa* "is a quite material faculty of representation which enables the poet and lover to keep the image of Beatrice constantly before him." Bundy discusses, without distinction, a "theory of vision" or "theory of imagination," since in relation to Dante's work the imagination could only be theorized as something materially aroused. The theoretical limits of this material view of imagination are evident in the end of the *Paradiso*, when the traveler is permitted to contemplate the mystery of the Trinity:

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Ne la profonda e chiara sussistenza
de l'alto lume parvermi tre giri
di tre colori e d'una contenza;
e Tun dall'altro come iri da iri
parea reflesso, e l terzo parea foco
che quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri.
Oh quanto è corto il dire e come fioco
almio concetto! (33.115-22)
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Within the profound and shining subsistence of the lofty Light appeared to me three circles of three colors and one magnitude; and one seemed reflected by the other, as rainbow by rainbow, and the third seemed fire breathed forth equally from the one and the other.

Oh how scant is speech, and how feeble to my conception!

In order that the dire (speech) not be corto (scant), Dante could not restrict himself to talking of the materiality of the rings, of their three colors and identical circumference, or of their reciprocal effulgence. That is, in order that the Trinity cease to be a mystery for man, it would be necessary that imagination no longer be merged passively with vision but rather become actively creative. Dante's citation ends by strategically anticipating one of the greatest difficulties confronted by the dynamic conception of imagination: the Christian vision of the world.

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In this examination of the historical development of the imagination, consider two affirmations made by James Engell:

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From 1710 to the 1750s, the imagination had risen in stature considerably. It acquired a moral, aesthetic, and even religious value that was almost exclusively positive.
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The increasing confidence in the creative imagination from about 1740 on led poets and critics to trust to and believe in it, to sense that they had a mission not only to fabricate a new world-view, a reappraisal of man and nature, but even to swaddle this thought and energy around human feelings in the forms, colors, and sounds of a rediscovered natural world.

Combined, these passages not only emphasize the relevance assumed by the imagination in the eighteenth century but also indicate the extension of its domain. And the fact that not only philosophers—aside from those considered here, Hobbes, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, and Schelling stand out—but also poets of the quality of Coleridge participate in both the redefinition and expansion of its relevance indicates that this is not a case of self-promotion on the part of artists. In fact, the latter were reacting to an orientation that developed in the domain of philosophy: the philosophy of the *cogito*, with its "haunting and almost sinister dualism" between the *res cogitans* (incarnated by man) and the *res cogitata* (reserved for nature). is indirectly responsible for the importance attributed to the imagination within both Continental rationalism and English empiricism. Compounding the dualism between man and the world, Descartes added the antagonism within man himself between reason, sustaining the *cogito*, and the passions, from which the author of *Les passions de l'âme* (1649) expected nothing but the tumultuous and troubling. The lesson of Descartes would be developed by
Malebranche, who would dedicate the whole of his second book of *La recherche de la vérité* (1674), entitled "De l’imagination," to demonstrating "the physical causes of malfunction and of errors of the imagination," as well as by the thinkers of Port-Royal, Arnauld and Nicole, in a more complex (and contemporary) work, *La logique ou l’art depenser* (1662-83), and by Arnauld and Lancelot in their *Grammaire générée et raisonné de Port-Royal* (1660). What brings them to the study of language is nothing but the uncertainty that the mobility of the passions creates for cognition. The repercussions of the praise reserved for mechanical reason in the *Discours de la méthode* (1637) helped bring about the decisive break with the unified cosmic vision that Christianity had cultivated for sixteen centuries.

Once the duality and progressive fragmentation of the world is established, especially with the development of the particular sciences, the question becomes whether it would be possible to reestablish a coherent worldview on another basis, through the primacy now conceded to the imagination. With this in mind, consider Engell’s contention that "the Enlightenment's view of the imagination had one immense advantage that the later nineteenth century failed to recapture: it focused on the source of creative power, on what permits the unified operation of all faculties, and at its highest pitch, on what constitutes genius and creativity in art."[VIII] To speak of the failure of the nineteenth century would be improper insofar as the very proponents of the productive imagination disagreed among themselves, and the differences did not merely consist in the opposition of diverse systems but comprised also those contradictions present within each system, as maximally manifest in Kant. Insofar as *das Erhabene* (the sublime) places in check the imaginative force that it actualizes, it determines the failure of the imagination as synthesizing capacity and creates the hope in those who experience it of recourse to the supernatural, since by reinstalling within his system the figure of the divine, Kant continually reaffirms the problematic aspect of the *final cause*. The affirmation of the imagination as "source of creative power" thus upsets the justification of religion. With such a source, the new cosmic vision would have to suppose either the exclusion of religion or the Kantian divide between the certain and the problematic. It is true, nevertheless, that this dilemma would present itself in no less speculative a spirit than that of Coleridge. Coleridge would not retreat from the approximation of the "dynamic imagination" with the divine. His very divergence from Kant's conclusions lies in the demonstration that a "unified operation of all faculties" would be capable of creating "self-confidence and self-reliance" only through an unequivocal acceptance of an entity with superhuman faculties. In sum, the discrepancy between Kant and Coleridge—the caution with which the former formulates what Zammito would call his Utopian vision[IX] weighed against the certainty with which the latter would affirm the unity of the creative in God—matters less than the insufficiency of a purely intellectual argument in its attempt to overcome the fragmentation between man and the world. It is in this sense that the creative imagination found in Christianity its great adversary.

A brief consideration of the opening of *Biographia Literaria* (1817), beginning with the initial passage of "On Poesy and Art," should suffice to advance the argument: "Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture and music, is the mediatress between and reconciler of, nature and man. It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation: color, form, motion, and sound are the elements which it combines, and it stamps them into unity in the mold of a moral idea."[X] The idea of the artist or poet is modified by the role conceded to the imagination, which creates a dynamic process that dissolves the separation between subject and object. As Coleridge says in *Aids to Reflection* (1825), "to think of a thing is different than to perceive it," as "to walk" is different than "to feel the ground under you."[XIII]

At first glance, the dissolution of the line differentiating subject and object touches only the human agent in both of these passages. Art has the power to "humanize nature," to extend the qualities of the producer to the object. Only attentive reading demonstrates the inverse as well: color, form, movement, and sound break beyond the bounds of the raw material. The effective fusion leads to another form of human identity: the moral idea. A "middle quality between a thought and a thing," as the poet defines art, thus maintains its human identity. This is, however, an expansive identity, significantly different from that process of absorption of the *Ichheit* with which Fichte defines man's contact with the world. While the dominion of the Fichtean self supposes the domination of that which the self assimilates, Coleridge argues that "in all genuine creation of art there must be a union of these separates"[XIII] (i.e., of similarity and difference). Such a combination of disparate elements is realized by the activity of genius, which establishes "a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it."[XIV] Rather than defining genius in the manner of Diderot and Kant, as that which extracts from nature an *energeia* unknown to human reason, Coleridge characterizes genius by a capacity for reconciliation that, rather than mediating between subject and object, mediates between the consciousness and unconsciousness of the subject. In this way, even before merging, by means of art, with the object on which it operates, the creative subject recomposes that which was divided: "There is in genius itself an unconscious activity."
The introduction of the unconscious in Coleridge's thought, probably due to Schelling's influence, led, albeit unsystematically, to a correction of the theory of imitation. While contingent, the correction is responsible for claims of this magnitude: "A good portrait is the abstract of the personal; it is not the likeness for actual comparison, but for recollection. This explains why the likeness of a very good portrait is not always recognized." Another, unfortunately unelaborated fragment indicates that the unconscious not only served Coleridge as a line of defense against an excessive emphasis on the self on the part of the romantics but also gave him the means to initiate a revision of the theory of mimesis. In an annotation in his notebooks, dated March 1810, he writes, "I wish much to investigate the connection of the Imagination with the Bildungstrieb—Imaginatio = imitatio vel repetitio Imaginis—per motum? Ergo, et motuum—The Variolae-generation—Is there not a link between physical Imitation—Imagination—? To suppose the connection between the imagination and the image-making impulse was equal to rooting the imagination in a force—ein Triebe—that lay elsewhere than in the consciousness of the subject. At the same time, the intermediary phrase limits Coleridge's intuition by establishing equality between the imagination and the repetition of the image, raising the question about the possible link between the imagination and physical imitation. The interposed comparison with generation (propagation) of the variolae leads one to believe that Coleridge did not perceive the difference between physical and psychical movement, compromising his initial intuition. Nevertheless, to suppose a Bildungstrieb represented thinking along the same line that delineated the abstraction of the likeness. Thus, while the tradition of imitatio ultimately predominated, a divergent, albeit unconscious, force made its entrance on stage.

An earlier fragment, drawn from a passage dated October 27, 1803, helps explain the dilemma that Coleridge encountered in his new equation: "Let him have created this infinity of Infinites—Still there is space in the Imagination for the Creation of Finities—but instead of these let him again create Infinites—Yet the same Space is left—it is [in] no way filled up. I feel too, that the whole rests on a miserable Sophism of applying to an Almighty Being such words as all. Why were not all—Gods? But there is no all, in creation—It is composed of Infinites—& the Imagination bewildered by heaping Infinites on Infinites." Coleridge raises two seemingly intertwined questions: that of divine power in relation to the power of the imagination and that of the infinite in relation to the all. To conceive of God as creator of the infinite of infinities does not impede attributing to the imagination the power to create finities. In this sense, the praise of the imagination does not collide with the conception of divinity. In contrast, the discord arises from the "miserable Sophism" inherent in the word all. For there is no everything in creation; instead, creation expresses itself through the composition of infinities. Eliminating the sophism would enable the connection between Creator and artist. The task of the imagination would then be compatible with divine conception. The reconciliation promoted by art includes that of the creative capacity—the "Creation of Finities"—with the creator of Infinites. But that harmony seems to demand a homology between the two creations. On this basis, the role of imitatio may be understood as the element that obstructs the way opened by the Bildungstrieb. Imitatio is preserved by Coleridge, despite his exaltation of the imagination, because it assures the preservation of a cosmology oriented by the divine.

The explication attempted above may be elucidated further by a concurring statement that Coleridge made in 1819, in which the imagination, understood as exclusively human, is seen as a power that reiterates what has already occurred in the creation of the world: "If there be aught that can be said to be purely in the human mind, it is surely those acts of its own imagination which the mathematician avails himself of . . . The mind . . . raises that wonderful superstructure of geometry and then looking abroad into nature finds that in its own nature it has been fathoming nature, and that nature itself is but the greater mirror in which he beholds his own present and his own past being in the law, and learns to reverence while he feels the necessity of that one great Being whose eternal reason is the ground and absolute condition of the ideas in the mind." In sum, Coleridge's "dynamic imagination" clearly represents an attempt to reconcile religious belief with an intuition that was gradually being revealed. In Coleridge's thought, Kantian reflective judgment was ceasing to function only as regulator in order to function also as determinant, and the supernatural was being affirmed, not only as problematic, but also as unquestionable.

I conclude this introduction with the renowned distinction between primary and secondary imagination, drawn by Coleridge in chapter 13 of his Biographia Literaria: While in "the finite mind" or primary imagination "the eternal act of creation" repeats itself, in the secondary imagination "fixed and dead" objects are revivified through combination. Both, but above all the primary imagination, are associated with the act of originary creation; in contrast, fancy is vested with a lower status, precisely because it supposes an activity that unfolds exclusively within the creation: "Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space." Coleridge's proposal—converting the imagination into a principle capable of breaking with both Cartesian and Kantian divides between reason and understanding—thus becomes untenable. If it is legitimate from the standpoint of the religious man—an attempt at an imaginatively conciliatory cosmic vision
compatible with Christianity—then it is fraught with the disadvantages, first, of seeming feeble when confronted
with Kant’s divided system; second, of lacking any practical application insofar as it constitutes a purely
intellectual engagement; and third, of requiring a retreat from its most advanced claims: the Bildungstrieb and
the differentiation between forms of imagination that Coleridge left only sketched out.

THE NOVEL

My concern with the novel as a genre must be limited to its capacity to elucidate the control of the imagination,
both as a concept and in application. Thus, I will consider, among classical reflections on the novel, relevant
contentions from Schlegel and Hegel, and among contemporary theories, even more partially, claims staked out
by Mikhail Bakhtin and Paul Zumthor.

Among Schlegel’s unparalleled qualities, prior to his conversion to Catholicism and to Metternich’s restoration
politics, is that of having understood the importance being assumed by the novel. One need only consider the
opening of fragment 26: "Novels are the Socratic dialogues of our time [Die Romane sind die sokratischen
Dialoge unserer Zeit]xxix Just as Socratic dialogue revolutionized the pre-Platonic philosophical tradition, the
novel would revolutionize the closed, monological forms of poetic genres. The parallel is not exact, however,
insofar as the praise that Schlegel reserved for Shakespeare shows his consciousness that the dividing line did
not oppose the novel to every other expressive form. In order to understand his peculiar designation of the
novel, we need to subdivide his analysis into three phases:

A. The novel involves the enhancement of raw material derived not from tradition, but
from individual history: "Many of the very best novels are compendia, encyclopedias of the
whole spiritual life of a brilliant individual [Mancher der vortrefflichsten Roman ist ein
Kompendium, eine Enzyklopädie des ganzen Lebens eines genialischen Individuums]" (KA,
no. 78 [KA], p. 156).

B. While the author recognizes the umbilical cord connecting the novel with the life
history of an individual, he refuses to respect the “psychological” character of its form. A
psychological reading is "illogical and petty [sehr inkonsequent, und klein“ (KA, no. 124 [AF],
p. 185). Against such a reading, Schlegel opposes the apprehension of the novelistic work as a
whole, whose details, in contrast to what occurs in a "rhetorical form," matter only insofar as
they contribute to its unity: "The teachings that a novel hopes to instil must be of the sort that
can be communicated only as wholes, not demonstrated singly, and not subject to exhaustive
analysis. Otherwise the rhetorical form would be infinitely preferable [Die Lehren welche ein
Roman geben will, müssen solche sein, die sich nur im Ganzen mitteilen, nicht einzeln
beweisen, und durch Zergleiderung erschopfen lassen. Sonst wäre die rhetorische Form
ungleich vorzüglicher"] (KA, no. 111 [AF], p. 181). To the critic, the fragment indicates a path
that Schlegel himself would take when confronted with Withelm Meister.

C. The political character attributed to "romantic poetry," in general, includes the novel:
"Poetry is a republican speech: a speech which is its own law and end unto itself, and in which
all the parts are free citizens and have the right to vote [Die Poesie ist eine republikanische
Rede: eine Rede, die ihr eines Gesetz und ihr eigner Zweck ist, wo alle Teile freie Bürger sind,
und mitstimmen dürfen]" (KA, no. 65 [KA], p. 155). But if the autonomy of art participates in
its politicization, it also indicates its temporality, through the absolute separation between the
ancients and moderns: "In the ancients we see the perfected letter of all poetry; in the moderns
we forsee its growing spirit [In den Alten sieht man den vollendeten Buchstaben der ganzen
Poesie: in den Neuern, ahnet man den werdenden Geist]“ (KA, no. 93 [KA], p. 158). Both the
unfinished quality of modern times and the revolutionary breath that would shake it are
recognizable in that difference. Hence the opening of fragment 216: "The French Revolution,
Fichte’s Science of Knowledge, and Goethe’s Meister are the greatest tendencies of the age
[Die Franzosische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethes Meister sind die
großen Tendenzen des Zeitalters]“ (KA, [AF] p. 198). If Fichte’s elaboration or exacerbation
of the self is countered by these fragments’ designation of the self as merely that raw material
based on which the formal totality of the work can be realized, then the revolutionary principle
is not that of a particular event: "Revolutions are universal, chemical not organic movements
[Revolutionen sind universelle nicht organische, sondern chemische Bewegungen]“ (KA, no.
426 [AF], p. 248).
The relationship between the novel and history delineated in Schlegel's "Fragments" is developed further in two finished essays, "Gespräch über die Poesie" (1800) and "Über Goethes Meister" (1798). Taking as starting point the affirmation "A novel is a romantic book [ein Roman ist ein romantisches Buch]" consider the subsequent claim: "Ancient poetry is entirely founded on mythology, and, as a matter of fact, avoids the properly historical stuff. Ancient tragedy is even a play; the poet, which represented a real event, seriously interesting the whole people, was punished. On the contrary, romantic poetry relies on a historical ground, much more than it is known or believed. Boccaccio is almost only true history, similarly to other sources from which sprout all romantic invention [Die alte Poesie schüttet sich durchgängig an die Mythologie an, und vermeidet sogar den eigentlichen historischen Stoff. Die alte Tragödie sogar ist ein Spiel, unter der Dichter, der eine wahre Begebenheit, die das ganze Bolk ernstlich anging, darstellte, ward bestraft. Die romantische Poesie hingegen ruht ganz auf historischem Gruence, weit mehr als man es weiß und glaubt. . . Boccaz ist fast durchaus wahre Geschichte, ebenso andre Quellen, aus denen alle romantische Erfindung hergeleitet ist]". The hiatus that separates modern from ancient poetry, which Schlegel had already discussed in the "Fragments," now finds an added, more objective rationale: ancient poetics relies on mythology and goes so far as disdaining history; modern poetics, on the contrary, bases itself precisely on historical material. (Taking Boccaccio as exemplar, the author demonstrates that the term Poesie encompasses both prose and poetry.) Contrary to what Hegel's homogenous vision of history would claim, the novel, as understood by Schlegel, cannot be investigated as a variant of atemporal epic. Its homogeneity is unthinkable for Schlegel insofar as, even in ancient literature, whose form is already fully realized, he finds evidence of a process of transformation to which that form is continually subject. Thus, the founders of tragedy find their material and model in the epic and, following the example of epic parody, in turn, develop satirical dramas.

If we add to this discontinuous, dynamic, and transformative vision of history the unfinished character of modern times, it becomes obvious why Schlegel and the universal, progressive poetics that he proposed were antipodes to the continuous and complete conception of history that Hegel develops in Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Despite that difference, these antagonists are not so opposite might be supposed. In "Rede über die Mythologie,[Speech on mythology]" part of the "Gespräch [Conversation on poetry]," Schlegel declares that modern man lacks a center of gravity (der Mittelpunkt) that mythology constituted for the ancients, and that it is not enough to note this lack but also necessary to strive seriously in order to produce such a center. Thus, he does not restrict himself to affirming our discontinuity, but insists that it befits humanity, fighting with all its might, "its Center to discover [ihr Zentrum zu finden]." How to reconcile that demand with one enunciated just a little earlier: "The supreme beauty, oh yes the supreme order relies only on Chaos [Die höchste Schönheit, ja die höchste Ordnung ist denn doch nur die des Chaos]". The answer may simply lie in the fact that Schlegel does not conceive of mythology as a mere horizon that encloses a meaning for life and for man. While it may contain that aspect that modern man lacks, it also has another, more relevant, trait—mythology is a "work of art of nature": "In its woven tissue, the supreme is really achieved: everything there is in relation and transformation, everything is assimilated and metamorphosed, and this assimilation and transformation is its peculiar proceeding, the heart of its matter, its method, if I can say so [In ihrem Gewerbe ist das Höchste wirklich gebildet; alles ist Beziehung und Verwandlung, angebildet und umgebildet, und dieses Anbilden und Umbilden eben ihr eigentümliches Verfahren, ihr imres Leben, ihre Methode, wenn ich so sagen darf]. The ordering center, existing or yet to be constructed, rather than annulling chaos, hides it behind the harmony it makes apparent. Hence Schlegel would say that he knew no lovelier symbol of the "originary chaos of human nature" than "the colorful swarm of the old gods [das bunte Gewimmel der alten Götter]." Hence also his praise for Tristram Shandy and Jacques le fataliste as works that exceed the Witz and the arabesque.
made concrete: no longer in service to some institution, it likewise does not serve to *illustrate* reality. It is a totality, "this harmony of dissonances [diese Harmonie von Dissonansen]" that, belonging to *Poésie*, cannot be confounded with one of its genres. Neither can such autonomy be exhausted in the endoscopy of the characters, since, the endoscopic demonstration of an education in the world is accomplished in both the characters and in the reader: "In some of them, one cannot ignore a certain sensibility, which becomes in many characters a large one. This happens because in developing natures, understanding and sensibility heighten and shape reciprocally [Mancher, dem man den Sinn nicht absprechen kann, wird sich in vieles langen rdcn finden konnen: denn bei fortschreitenden Naturen erweitern, schärfen und bilden sich Begriff und Sinn gegenseitig]."

The principles proposed and practiced by Schlegel are antagonistic to Hegel's vision of both the novel in particular and art in general. Schlegel could compete with neither the extraordinary speculative force nor the conservatism that undergirded all of Hegel's reflections on art. Limiting this discussion to the presence of these qualities in the section of his work devoted to romanticism, in which art could no longer be capable of satisfying the highest necessities of the spirit, this "happens because (romanticism) becomes sure of its truthfulness only due to the fact that the external side brings with it its internal one and sets up the external reality as an unfitted existence to it [wird sich seiner Wahrheit nur dadurch gewiß, daß er sich aus dem Äußeren in seine Innigkeit mit sich zurückführt und die äußere Realität als ein ihm nicht adequate Dasein setzt]".* Thus, the "infinite value is contained by the real and individual subject, in his interior life" ["das wirkliche, einzelne Subjekt in seiner inneren Lebendigkeit ist es, das unendlichen Wert erhält," 501]. But to make this affirmation is to demonstrate the unsatisfactory character that art had achieved, since, insofar as "absolute interiority" constitutes "the true content of romanticism," art begins to contain a pantheon of dethroned gods, destroyed by subjectivity, "and instead of plastic polytheism, art knows now only one God, a spirit, an absolute autonomy, which, as far as the absolute knowledge and desire rely on itself in full freedom [und statt der plastischen Vielgötterei kennt die Kunst jetzt nur einen Gott, einen Geist, eine absolute Selbständigkeit, welche als das absolute Wissen und Wollen ihrer selbst mit sich in freier Einheit bleibt]" (502). "Having achieved this level . . . the interior is exteriorization without exteriority, invisible and, so to speak, perceptible only to itself" [Das Innere . . . so auf die Spitze hinausgetrieben, ist die äußerlichkeitslose Äußerung, unsichtbar gleichsam nur sich selber vernehmend] (508). Distanced from the "free concept of the beautiful," dispossessed of the objective exteriority that contributed to the quality of Greek sculpture, art finds itself now contaminated "on every side by the accidental and particular character of the finite exterior world" (515). That fatal plunge into subjectivity accompanied by a merely accidental external world, that loss of classical equilibrium would render appreciable only those values related to individual pathos: "honor, love, loyalty, and courage, the aims and duties of romantic chivalry" or, in Hegel's own world, to the struggles and aspirations proper to those so-called years of apprenticeship, of "education by that reality existing for the individual" (567).

Hegel's extraordinary speculative capacity places itself in the service of conservatism—recognizing as true only the art of the past. But this conservatism was not accidental: it was necessary for the affirmation of his system, which demanded the "demonstration" that the hour of art had passed. These brief reflections seek to establish the position of the Romanesque (*Das Romanhafte*) in the Hegelian aesthetic, but in fact, it was designated already at the beginning of the section devoted to romanticism, demonstrating the decadence, of art. Art is characterized, "on one side, by the reproduction of exterior objects in the accidentalness of its form, and on the other, in contrast, by humor as the liberation of subjectivity from its internal accidentalness"(582). Discovering ideal classical harmony lost in contemporary art, Hegel finds exceptions only in Flemish painting—with the qualification that its "objects could not satisfy anyone with a more profound sense, resulting from a content (Gehalt) that was in itself true" (572)—and in what he calls "objective humor." This is defined as a "penetration" (*Verinnigung*) into the object, reaching beyond the merely accidental objectivity and the subjective representation characteristic of the beginning of romanticism (cf.582). But, he adds, "such penetration can be only partial and manifest itself only occasionally in the circuit of a *Lied* or only as a part of a greater work" (582). It is true, as Kathrin Rosenfield acutely observes, that, insofar as the *Lied* constitutes in Hegel's view an expression of "subjective comprehension, of spiritual appropriation" (*Auffassung*), one might think of it "as a hybrid form or mist," comparable to the novel, "above all when one thinks of the interminable and structurally open fragment of *Wilhelm Meister*." But the fact is that Hegel did not think this. Could his failure to do so be explained simply by his conservatism or by his systematic need to take art as a surpassed form of expression? There may be a less speculative explication inherent in his conception of language as the instrumental means for conjugating the interior with the exterior: "Then, content is the decisive aspect of art, in the same way as in every human work [Denn der Gehalt ist es, der, wie in allem Menschenwerk, so auch in der Kunst entscheidet]"(584). Whereas Schlegel may have lacked Hegel's speculative capacity, he did understand that language is conductive and not merely a collector of content. In Hegel's thought, rather than an error in appreciation, we find a systematic incomprehension of art. It is not so strange then that Hegel's thought should have become a special source for the control of the imagination.
I conclude this section on the novel with a very brief analysis of two contemporary scholars, Paul Zumthor and Mikhail Bakhtin. Without delineating their full contributions to the theory of the novel, let me set in relief those among their formulations that develop the concept of the control of the imagination. Two passages from Zumthor's work suggest a point of departure:

Formalized in ordinary language, but also shaped by high narrative or rhetorical demands, in fact, the novel does not renounce the supremacy of Latin, the foundation and instrument of clerical power. In contrast to the folktales that sustain the common people, it demands vast dimensions: a long duration of reading and hearing, during which the developments of the plot, however entangled they may seem, are projected towards a future that is never closed and that excludes all circularity. Discourse thus discovers, at its own level, as a guarantee of the richest connotations, the trait of incompleteness and indefiniteness characterizing ordinary words.\textsuperscript{60}

A poetry whose functioning implies the predominance of the voice manifests an indisputable truth and possesses by this means a plenitude that makes possible its perpetual renewal. A poetic discourse in which the vocal part is reduced is divided, plays against itself, engenders internal contradiction. The man who speaks it and the one who hears him begin to know that they will never know. The power of abstraction grows, nevertheless, with the role of writing in the genesis and economy of texts, but it denies every equivalence between language and truth, an equivalence that, on the contrary, exalts theatricalized performance.\textsuperscript{61}

Born at the intersection of orality and writing, the novel in its medieval form guarantees an open discourse by opting for the vernacular. It opposes the closure—all the more closed at the moment in which Latin is known and understood only by clerics—of sacred poetic forms. By adopting the incompleteness of the spoken word of a living language, the novel prepares itself for the primordial part that it will play several centuries later, culminating in the role delineated by Zumthor in the second passage: Insofar as the novel "manifests an indisputable truth," the reduction on the part of orality stimulates contradiction and, with it, the renunciation of an equivalence between language and truth. The novel, beginning with its medieval manifestations, thematizes the role of language with respect to truth, its constitutive incompleteness and, consequently, its fictional status. As we will see, this will be the fundamental cog in the mechanism of control.

Drawing even more briefly on Bakhtin's work, we may denote first a difference between the novel and other genres. In his renowned essay, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," Bakhtin observes that, while in other genres "the most contiguous possible position of the author, the point of view necessary to the shaping of the material, is dictated by the genre itself, . . . within the genre of the novel, there is no such immanent position for the author. You may publish a packet of business documents, personal letters (a novel in letters), a manuscript by 'nobody-knows-who, written for nobody-knows-who and who-found-it-and-where nobody knows.'\textsuperscript{62\‘} This lack of self-characterization and consequent uncertainty of the author's position in the novel provoke, as Bakhtin immediately observed, the author's necessary adoption of a mask, which in turn places in question the conventional synonymy between fiction and acceptable falsehood. In other words, the novel upsets the traditionally recognized position of the "literary." As Bakhtin would intuit in relation to Evgenii Onegin in his essay "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse," "literary language is not represented in the novel as a unitary, completely finished-off and indisputable language—it is represented precisely as a living mix of varied and opposing voices, developing and renewing itself.\textsuperscript{62\‘} "Literary" language and acceptable "fiction" (or falsehood) are questioned simultaneously, so that the novel's heteroglossia becomes a formal problem to the degree that it manifests itself as a problem related to the definition of truth. This demonstrates how the control of the imagination is umbilically linked to the history of the novel. Insofar as the question of control is a formal one concerning when fiction is acceptable and what its relation may be to factual history, it also becomes an epistemological one, concerning the nature of truth and of the real with which "serious" discourses would be obliged to correspond. It is not so strange then that the question of control should come to the fore in the highly reflexive literature of the recent decades.

**CONTROL, AND THE NOVEL AS A PRIVILEGED CONTEXT FOR ITS COMPREHENSION**

There are cultures that forbid the reproduction of both the divine and human figure. In light of that interdiction, arguments against a certain mode of artistic representation or against the thematization of a certain problem may seem to have restricted relevance. Or it may be that the question of the control of the imagination has not received greater attention precisely because Western culture has not known the prohibition against figural representation. Furthermore, if we recall that the autonomy of art is affirmed at least since the end of the
eighteenth century, with the Frühromantiker and Kant’s Third Critique, in which the imagination is no longer subject to the work of understanding, then it may seem that control does not deserve theoretical consideration. For these among other reasons, the hypothesis of the control of the imagination is a recent formulation, which, for lack of scholarly engagement has not advanced significantly in the past sixteen years. In this context, I hope to refine the general coordinates of the hypothesis through an empirical examination in relation to the novel as a genre.

Let me begin, then, with a general delineation of the question. What is termed the control of the imagination should not be confounded with censorship either of literary works or tendencies. Censorship is rather a punctual prohibition, sanctioned by norms, and condemns the circulation of works with a given combination of characteristics. In contrast, control involves a more delicate decision: something is perceived as unacceptable, improper, or base, but its production is not simply prohibited. Since it is not, the very control applied to it can serve as a stimulus for another form of artistic expression. But at any instant, dependent on historic conjunction, control can also give way to censorship. Thus, it would make no sense to speak of the control of avant-garde art under Nazism or Stalinism or to say that Baudelaire and Flaubert were controlled. No, Baudelaire, Flaubert, and the avant-garde were censored.

A very complicated question, to which I can only allude here, concerns the principle of imitatio, into which Aristotelian mimesis developed, whether, indirectly, in the less speculative thinking of the Romans or with the monumental Renaissance rediscovery of Aristotle’s Poetics. Countering any claim that Aristotelian phantasia already constituted a controlling practice, one might contend that it was rather, in Aristotle’s thinking, a minor conceit, with a heuristic function, that would not even intervene in his conception of mimesis. However, the reservations in the Poetics itself concerning Euripides, the most critical of the Greek tragedians, might make one hesitate. Could the secondary status of phantasia and its lack of articulation within the Aristotelian concept of mimesis, given the latter’s evidently liberating function with respect to the Platonic conception, be sufficient in place of a theory of the control of the imagination? Or could the lack of a concept of imagination signify that its importance in the production of art was unknown? The dubiousness of this proposal grows as we abandon the Aristotelian legacy and, among the Romans, reflect on a passage in Pliny the Elder: “We must not pass over a novelty that has also been invented, in that likenesses made, if not of gold or silver, yet at all events of bronze are set up in the libraries in honour of those whose immortal spirits speak to us in the same places, nay more, even imaginary likenesses are modelled and sense of loss gives birth to countenances that have not been handed down to us, as occurs in the case of Homer [Non est praetereundum et novicium inuentum, siquidem non ex auro argentoue, at certe ex aere in bibliothecis dicantur ilulis, quorum immortales animae in locis iisdem loquentur, quin immo etiam quae non sunt finguntur, pariumque desideria non traditos uultus, sicut in Homero euenit].” Pliny addresses the representation in public places of immortal figures whose traits—unknown—were necessarily products of the imagination. Although the author pragmatically considers the public’s avid desire to see such reproductions a proof of their likeness, in fact, their favorable reception functions as an alibi for their form, which is to say that nonreproductive imagination was not in itself acceptable. Is there not a veiled form of control implied by upholding the similarity of the representation to the figure represented?

Even more reasonably, one might say that the ideal of imitatio propounded in Renaissance poetics, while far from confounding itself with the copy, approximated what is meant by control: perceptual data are valorized, although the work of art, whether verbal or pictorial, admittedly does not follow these to the line. An argument might even be made that control insinuates itself in classical art from the moment that Robortello, in translating passage 51al2 of the Poetics, substitutes eikós or anankainon for quod verum est et necessarium. By substituting the disjunctive function with the inclusive et, Robortello affirmed that discourse must satisfy, by dint of the necessarium, what in the Aristotelian treatise had contained also the alternative to verisimilitude. Like the sword of Damocles, control hangs over the poet’s head, which, according to Robortello, ought not be restricted by the standard of verisimilitude. One may thus conjecture that imitatio was the root from which the classical control would develop, finding its practical justification above all in religious reasons. Alongside Renaissance treatises on poetics, the most important work for a concrete examination of this development of control is Tasso’s “Discorsi del poema eroico” (1594), but this text still does not address the novel proper.

The novel is a particularly propitious genre for the study of control because the author does not occupy an immanent position and is obliged to put on masks. These leave the reader uncertain as to how to react to the “masquerader” (the buffoon, the fool, the trickster), motivating authorial intervention with an explicatory or controlling word. If this seems to suggest a control on the verge of becoming explicit censorship, the use of masks also favors the anarchic word, and the absence of a fixed place that would permit identification and
control of the author is compounded by the problem of the genre's heteroglossia. In Bakhtin's words, "the language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and analyze it as a single unitary language." While designated as a dialogic form par excellence, the novel, nevertheless, distances itself from the ideal type of dialogic discourse conceived by Bakhtin by dint of disciplinary control that reduces the multiplicity of languages in the novel and, consequently, its discordant political and moral values. This reduction was recognized also by a thinker who had no particular respect for the novel—thus, Hegel concluded, "the truly poetic in art, then, is exactly that which we call ideal." But this judgment did not work for the genre. Rather than complying with any idealized form in the manner of classical epic and tragedy, as Hegel understood these genres, the novel, however much it was subjected to control, concerned itself with the adventures and misadventures of a self. Insofar as antiquity did not know the psychological subject, classical romance recovered "an abstract expanse of space," in which there was no place for a "biographical-time sequence." In contrast, as recent medievalist scholarship has demonstrated, the entrance of the psychological subject onto the stage of the curtailed twelfth-century Renaissance was accompanied by the momentary recognition of the fictional as the proper subject of literature and of the romance as its proper form: "The moment when literature recognizes that its material is fiction is also . . . that in which the author enters the scene. It is the moment, par excellence, of the novel." This accumulation of novelties—the psychological subject, fictive rather than mythical material, Romanesque or novelistic form—would be interrupted, and gradually processed precisely because it signaled a drastic transition at the core of medieval culture, from orality to writing. Zumthor recognizes the connection between the moment of maximal crisis and the question of control:

From an epoch that lasted, depending on location, from 1150 to around the end of the eighteenth century we find the texts of stories, songs, and liturgical pieces written in the vernacular. It may even be that some of these texts were composed with the stylus or quill in hand. By dint of this technology, what L. Costa Lima calls a "control of the imagination" was introduced discretely, though its efficacy does not become plainly apparent until after 1500, following an era of growing tensions common (in various respects) to all Western nations: tensions between traditional poetic energies and forces seeking to impose on the verb a logic of its own, to the detriment of the living word.

Contemporary medieval scholarship has more to say in this respect. Eugene Vance accentuates the importance to twelfth-century narrative fiction of studies that, with Abelard, surpassed the separation of logic and grammar: "Surely the prospect of systematically combining words into propositions, and of disposing propositions as valid arguments whose truth could pertain to reality, yet be ontologically distinct from reality, was invaluable to a burgeoning poetics of written vernacular fiction. For fiction, too, was a discourse whose textual utterances could presume to reflect things that truly exist, yet whose truth could be autonomous from what exists because such truth resided in the internal coherence of the story itself." This passage renders more concretely Zink's idea of "literary subjectivity": a more adept manipulation of the logical resources available for configuration within the phrase permitted writers to explore subtleties of rational language as well as linguistic transgressions of language, which, as Vance adds, were transgressions through the marvelous. Vance's reflection yields yet another insight, insofar as he notes that the intercourse between logic and fictionality was not necessarily harmonious: "If twelfth-century rhetoric is strong in dealing with all of those figural resources of speech that exploit and amplify the inherent equivocity of conventional signs, the goals of twelfth-century logic are quite opposite: logic teaches us how to overcome the radical equivocity of conventional signs and to utter truths that are univocal, distinct, necessary, and permanent. One science of discourse is centrifugal, playful, relativistic, opportunistic, and subversive; the other is centripetal, serious, totalizing, constant, and recuperative. . . . The tension between them is an important constituent of twelfth-century vernacular poetics."

This tension is essential to the framework on which, beginning with the Renaissance, control would be configured, as it is to our understanding of why control does not impede the appearance of intentionally fictional works. Furthermore, this tension does not appear only between discordant discursive practices, such as logical discourse and novelistic discourse. Already in *Tristan et Iseut*, in the work of writers such as Chrétien de Troyes, Robert de Boron, and the anonymous author of *Lancelot du Lac*, the effort to reconcile narrative with truth, that is, to harmonize the récit with an extrinsic principle of truth, is salient. This signifies that the authors of the earliest narratives in the vernacular not only benefited from the advances of logic, but also attempted to make their narrative sequences congruent with logical affirmations. Yet this is not a predictable development based on the discrepancy denoted by Vance. There is a notable effort within the centrifugal discourse of the nascent "literature" to reconcile narrative sequences, even when their material comprised the marvelous, with a true or immemorial referent or with a referent that declared itself factually witnessed. Whence the insistence of the narrator on declaring the fidelity of his account either to a primitive "tale" now transcribed or to what had been transmitted to him by a supposed eyewitness. Thus, in *Merlin*, the magician Merlin declares to Blaise, the narrator of the adventures of the Grail, that, in recompense for his work, his work will be recited, that is, will be
viewed with respect, although "it will not be [taken as] an authority, since you are not, nor can you be [counted] among the apostles." The immediately following clause makes explicit the hierarchy of texts with respect to truth: "Neither did the apostles ever put in writing anything from our Lord other than that which they had seen and heard, while you have put in nothing that you have seen or heard, other than that which I have told you." Since he did not witness that of which he writes, the narrator lacks the authority of the apostles, but his text is true because it contains what Merlin, eyewitness of the events, relates. The same control of the fiction in the name of the truth of what is being recounted reappears in Yvain ou le Chevalier au Lyon: "Thus, he who wishes to understand me should entrust me with his heart and his ears, for I do not wish to tell either dream, or fable, or falsehood."

The preceding examples, which might be easily multiplied, demonstrate that the transition from orality to writing, that the appearance of the chivalric romance, that the exploration of the fictional vein had to take into account the reaction of purportedly hegemonic religious discourse. Hence obligatory authorial caution and play with concessions. Only a study specifically devoted to the issue could explicate the transience of the Church in permitting the circulation of such texts. The important role that popular culture would play in the work of a Rabelais, as demonstrated by Bakhtin, suggests that, despite its vast political power, in fact, the Church did not have a monopoly and so imposed control only on authors and movements that confronted it directly. As noted earlier, control supposes a sort of alibi: the circulation of something discordant in some sense with accepted truth is permissible as long as its agent domesticates its discrepancy, that is, makes it possible to integrate it.

This brief incursion into the medieval "crisis" has served as an example of the concretization of the control of the imagination. Because this notion pretends to be no more than an analytic operator, we may skip several centuries, turning to the English novel of the eighteenth century, and particularly to prefaces and critical material published between 1691 and 1778, in order to survey the situation of the novel on the eve of its affirmation as the genre par excellence of modern times.

**CONTROL IN ACTION: THE "LAMIATION" OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY**

We may take as entry point into the eighteenth-century English novel two brief passages from Daniel Defoe, the first of which belongs to the mini-preface to Robinson Crusoe (1719), and the second, to the slightly amplified preface to its continuation, published in the same year: "The editor believes the thing to be a just history of fact; neither is there any appearance of fiction in it." The just application of every incident, the religious and useful inferences drawn from every part, are so many testimonies to the good design of making it publick, and must legitimate all the part that may be call'd invention or parable in the story. Three elements stand out: (a) the author assumes the mask of the editor; (b) the function of his disguise is that of negating the work's fictional status; (c) although the "invention or parable" introduced in the preface to Farther Adventures in some sense contradicts that negation, the account could cease being "a just history of fact" insofar as it contains "religious and useful inferences." Such inferences domesticate the fiction, conferring on it a function that would justify its use.

In 1724, in his preface to Roxana, or the Fortunate Mistress, Defoe notes that his tale differs "from most of the Modern Performances of this kind" in that "the Foundation of This is laid in Truth of Fact, and so the Work is not a Story but a History." The insistence on negating the fictional character of the narrative and on affirming its veracity or historical reality is instigated by more than religious and biographical motives. This becomes evident in the reiteration of the topos almost thirty years later by an essayist now unknown. In the November 18, 1754, edition of The Adventurer, John Hawkesworth defines both the interest in history and its limits: "History is a relation of the most natural and important events; history, therefore, gratifies curiosity, but it does not often excite terror or pity; the mind feels not that tenderness for a falling state, which it feels for an injured beauty."

To label a text as history would suffice only if readers did not feel the need to manifest their own emotions and to find in the text a cathartic liberation (exciting their "terror or pity"). The deviation of fiction from the mark is greater even than denoted by Defoe's "invention or parable," and it becomes more clear how the term domestication applies here: it is not simply a matter of censoring the novel, or of impeding its circulation but rather of adapting its form relative to the horizon of beliefs and values shared by critics and authors. The question they faced was how to adapt it without offending the criteria of utility and virtue. Hawkesworth continues by observing that in epic and "old romance," "truth is apparently violated" and yet "the pleasure arising from the story is not much lessened." The pleasure aroused serves as alibi, legitimizing the form. However, the critic takes a less sympathetic stance relative to the "novel," which, if it has the advantage over those genres of the past if it maintains its proximity to history, "has yet less the power of entertainment," for "it surprises us less." In fact, among the authors we have considered, Hawkesworth is the least comfortable with
the solution toward which the eighteenth-century English novel is headed. The role of history seems unquestionable to him, but he considers it insufficient to satisfy the imagination of the reader: "Fancy requires new gratifications, and curiosity is still unsatisfied." This difficulty is compounded by another: if "the Epic Poem at once gratifies curiosity and moves the passions," but the events recovered do not represent "the fate of a nation," how, then, to shape a genre that would retain as much as possible of real history, release the imagination of the reader, and stimulate national sentiment? As we will see, in order for the novel to become a legitimate genre, it would be necessary that it first answer these questions.

It would be arbitrary to suppose, however, that critics and authors occupied consistently coherent positions that would facilitate an adequate response. Hawkesworth's praise of the "old romance," for example, was already, at midcentury, in some sense belated. In 1705, Mary Delarivièvre Manley had criticized "The Prodigious Length of the Ancient Romances", "the Mixture of so many Extraordinary Adventures, and the great Number of Actors that appear on the Stage, and the Likeness which is so little managed, all which has given a Distaste to Persons of Good Sense." Here we find the respect for history, long before its manifestation in Defoe, in the connection between "so many Extraordinary Adventures" whose "Likeness is so little managed" and romances. Thus, that which was being sought out could not be in any way a continuation with the prose of the past. Rather the very term romance needed a replacement. That contention acquired significant strength in 1748 through the intervention of the novelist Tobias Smollett, who contended that the genre originated in "ignorance, vanity, and superstition" that had given way to "the heathen mythology, which is no other than a collection of extravagant romances." Furthermore, its authors, although incapable of competing with those of epic and tragedy, "were resolved to excite them in fiction, and apply to the wonder rather than the judgment of their readers." In Smollett's argument, the religious case reinforces the renunciation of fictional material, and both defer to the question of truth. In light of the gathered testimony, we can understand, even if provisionally, how the respect for history was associated with values on a philosophico-religious spectrum and, consequently, how the variables inherent in the process of controlling domestication comprised elements that were aesthetic, political (the nation), pragmatic (utility), philosophico-religious, and concerned with public interest. Yet the fact that Hawkesworth could still defend the romance demonstrates that control did not operate in accord with any official purpose, but might, on the contrary have included the entire literate community within its convergences and contradictions. This would explain the position espoused by Hugh Blair, writing "On Fictitious History" in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Poetry (1762). In contrast to Smollett, Blair takes the romance not as the opposite of proper customs but as having the merit "of being written of the highly moral and heroic kind," although not of a sort that could be considered a model for contemporary society, because adapted "to the legends and superstitious notions concerning magic and necromancy." It was this that motivated Blair's preference for the "familiar novel," despite the fact that its exemplars in Louis XIV's France and Charles II's England "were in general of a trifling nature, without the appearance of moral tendency, or useful instruction." In other words, Blair concurred, albeit not as rigorously as Smollett, with the general direction in which a prosaic genre was developing, with its useful and moral orientation and its greater proximity to the quotidian life of the common reader. This is the model that he saw incarnated both by Robinson Crusoe, which, captivating the imagination of the reader, stimulated it "for surmounting the difficulties of any external situation," preparing it, thus, for enterprises favorable to the nation, and, above all, by "Mr. Fielding's Novels," "highly distinguished for their humour." To the extent that Blair indicates contemporary examples of what was being sought after, we can conclude that the conditions of the novel had already supplanted the marvelous that dominated in old romance. In 1785, Clara Reeve offered a synthetic taxonomy of the genre: "The Romance is an heroic fable, which treats of fabulous persons and things. The Novel is a picture of real life and manners, and of the times in which it is written. The Romance in lofty and elevated language describes what never happened nor is likely to happen. The Novel gives a familiar relation of such things, as pass every day before our eyes." The mechanism of control emerges clearly here. It is a matter of promoting, albeit not in an intentional or conscious manner, an entertaining narrative that, while speaking in a prosaic and familiar way, would be useful, respect truth and religion, favor enterprises benefiting the nation, and maintain history, that is, fact, as its horizon. This codification is implicit already in a passage written by Holcroft in 1780: "Modern writers use the word Romance to signify a fictitious history of detached and independent adventures: . . . in a Novel, a combination of incidents, entertaining in themselves, are made to form a whole." Even though Holcroft distinguishes the two terms according to "aesthetic" criteria, he concludes his argument by considering the "utility" to which "the legitimate Novel" lends itself: "The legitimate Novel is a work much more difficult than the Romance, and justly deserves to be ranked with those dramatic pieces whose utility is generally allowed." It is the examination of the eighteenth-century debate that demonstrates what was really at stake under the guise of an aesthetic discussion. In the meantime, even if we were to agree that the formal criterion removes the
In contrast, *Tristram Shandy* demonstrates the degree to which control, as such, does not impede the circulation of works that contradict it. Sterne's exception is motivated by *formal reason* that a respect for history would veil: in *Tristram Shandy*, narrative linearity is purposely violated. Without pretending to write a preface or conjugate/multiply one, the narrator comments: "In this long digression which I was accidentally led into, as in all digressions (one only excepted) there is a master-stroke of digressive skill." The attention devoted to digression, which will, in fact, constitute the *principio compositionis* of the book, deconstructs the entire novelistic mechanism. The reader loses the sure guide who might offer a standard for his own conduct; but the narrative gains in terms of irony what is lost in terms of utility. Wolfgang Iser, one of the work's best interpreters, points out: "Instead of demonstrating something, [the narrator] himself becomes the object of scrutiny, thus causing a shift in the narrative tradition by opening up hitherto unexplored realms: the hero, having lost his various traditional functions, is now set free to become a subject in his own right; and being thrown back upon himself, as it were, he begins to discover himself in all his difficult complexity." Iser demonstrates that the linear function of history—typical of the eighteenth-century English novel and systematically disregarded by Sterne—continually subordinated the thematicization of the subject to other parameters: the nation, utility, truth, and so forth. Only in rebelling against the linear treatment of history does Sterne make possible the analysis of the self in its proper internal configuration.

In sum, we can associate the function of the control of the imagination with the double instability that McKeon notes in the formation of the English novel: "the instability of generic categories" and that of "social categories." The former "registers an epistemological crisis, a major cultural transition in attitudes toward how to tell the truth in narrative." The second "registers a cultural crisis in attitudes toward how the external social order is related to the internal, moral state of its members." The first case involves the necessity that the novel repudiate any sort of familiar relationship with the romance and anchor itself strongly in history. This would equal a veto of the fictional, a veto on which control would build. The second case instead involves offering the reader the novel as mirror and guide. That is, with the elevation of the self, it was a matter of domesticating the individual, making him useful and respectful of the current norms. This, in turn, would result in the importance of the novel—not only its English variant—for the formation of a national spirit. Benedict Anderson has already demonstrated that declining legitimacy of the "sacral monarchy" began in England with the execution of Charles Stuart in 1649. The concept of nationalism, or of "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign," develops as a result of the crisis of legitimacy—along with other factors that I cannot explore here, including the crisis of Latin as the language employed in the writing of books and the crisis ensuing from the development of the printing press. Anderson underlines the important part played by the novel in this process, insofar as the actions and actors in the novel are homogenized from the common vantage point of the nation: "That all these acts are performed at the same cokked, calendrical time, but by actors who may be largely unaware of one another, shows the novelty of this imagined world conjured up by the author in his readers' mind."
life of reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture.”
His disdain for the word reflected a greater attention owed to the world, with an emphasis on observation and the empirical, to the detriment of work on the writing itself, on those cobwebs “admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.”
The attack launched against the fine web of words and images was augmented by the equivalence established between the sciences of the ruse and the imagination: “astrology, natural magic, and alchemy . . . have had better intelligence and confederny with the imagination of man than with his reason.”

In Bacon (and in Descartes) we find the first indication of a vast crisis to which the control of the imagination would respond. While the form of control would be modified in accordance with the importance assumed by the imagination, above all after Kant’s Third Critique, the suspicion awakened by the word and by the function of mere transmission associated with language would continue to act in favor of control and in hostility toward fiction. Although I have considered only the English novel of the eighteenth century, the control of the imagination that extends over the course of the century to the Frühromantiker, in the century’s final decades, depends fundamentally on the function of language, particularly on its part in representation and communication, and on the veto of the fictional. Even a restless thinker and writer of the quality of Diderot would not escape it: “However well made it may be, the best representation, the most coherent, is no more than a fabric of falsehoods that overlie one another.”

REFERENCES

i The term was first defined in L. Costa Lima, O controle do imaginário: Razao e imaginagao nos tempos modernos (São Paulo, 1984), trans. Ronald W. Sousa as Control of the Imaginary: Reason and Imagination in Modern Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). It was subsequently developed in Sociedade e discurso ficcional (Rio de Janeiro, 1986) and O fingidor e o censor (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), works that were merged together in the English translation, The Dark Side of Reason: Fictionality and Power, trans. Paolo Henriques Britto (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).

ii In this regard, see the article by Sérgio Alcides in Portuguese Literary & Cultural Studies, ed. J. C. de Castro, 4 (Spring 2000).


iv For the author, fantasy is the general term that includes the imagination—"the meaning of interior images" ("le sens d'images intérieures")—and not, as usually translated, its synonym.


viii Ibid., 31,33.

ix Ibid., 33.


xv Ibid., 8.

xvi Ibid., 7.

xvii Ibid., 79.


xxi *Biographia Literaria*, 2:256.
xxii Ibid., 258.
xxiii Ibid., 259.
xxvii Ibid., 1:202.
xxviii Cf. Ibid., 292.
xxix Ibid., 312.
xxx Ibid., 314.
xxxii Ibid., 313.
xxxiii Ibid., 318.
xxxiv Ibid., 329.
xxxv Ibid., 329.
xxxvi In order to economize space, with respect to the role of the arabesque in the novel, I simply point the reader to one of Schlegel's posthumously published fragments: "Das Wesentliche im Roman ist die chaotische Form—Arabesken, Mährchen [What is essential in a novel is the chaotic form - the arabesque, the fairy-tale]." (1799), KA, 26:276, no. 274.
xxxvii Cf. KA, no. 111.
xxxix Cf. Ibid., 130.
xl Ibid., 135.
xxli Schlegel contended that the reflections on *Hamlet* scattered throughout the Meister constituted not merely criticism, but high poetry, adding a phrase that Hegel would disdain: "Das muß alle Kritik, weil jedes vortreffliche Werk, von welcher Art es auch sei, mehr weiß als es sagt, und mehr will als es weiß [This might be the function of all criticism, since all work of excellence, of any kind, knows more than what it says and wishes more than if knows]" (ibid., 140, italics added).
xxlv Cf. note 1.
xxlvi Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," 1975, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 161. Curiously, without Zumthors having known Bakhtin's text, written decades earlier than its first publication (1937-38), this passage reinforces the former medievalist's observation concerning the novel's distinction in lacking an immanent form. This lack affects not only the position of the author, as Bakhtin insists, but has the added, more general effect of foreshadowing the a priori recognition of the genre to which the text might belong: is it the text that speaks the truth or what? (Thus, for example, Schlegel observes with incisive irony that Rousseau's *Confessions* is an excellent novel, whereas *La nouvelle Héloïse*, merely a middling one (cf. "Gespräch über die Poesie," 339).
xxlviii Cf. note 1.
2 "Orationis miximé proprium & genuinum munus est, proferre id, quod verum est, quia aliter
In an analogous manner, if modernity stimulates the development of the Bildungsroman—making congruent the genre par excellence of our time and the ideal of the formation of the self—a certain French novelist will change that entire panorama: "Flaubert killed off the novel of 'formation': and bêtise, with a bit of luck, gave birth to the new man" (Franco Moretti, Oppere mondo: Saggio sulla forma epica dot "Faust" a "Cent'anni di solitudine" [Turin, 1994], 69, trans. Q. Hoare as Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Marquez [London: Verso, , 1996], 73).

Bakhtin, "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse," 47, italics added.

Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," 89. Consequently, "the world of the Greek romance is an alien world: everything in it is indefinite, unknown, foreign" (101). Along the same line of thought, Auden explains why Shakespeare was born at the right time: "The drama had to become secularized before any adequate treatment of human history was possible.... Human history cannot be written except on the presupposition that, whatever part God may play in human affairs, we cannot say of one event, 'This is an act of God,' "This is a natural event," and of another, 'This is a human choice'; we can only record what happens. The allegorical morality plays are concerned with history, but only with subjective history; the social-historical setting of any particular man is excluded (W.H. Auden, "The Globe," in The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays, ed. E. Mendelson [New York: Vintage Books, 1989], 180-81).

Zumthor, "Et la 'litterature'?" 315.


This is confirmed by Michael McKeon, who observes that "it is only around the middle of the eighteenth century that 'the novel' becomes the dominant and standard term" (The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987], 25).


Thomas Smollett, "Preface to The Adventures of Roderick Random" (1748), mAO, 63.

Hugh Blair, "On Fictitious History," Lectures on Rhetoric and Poetry, in AO, 76.

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Clara Reeve, The Progress of Romance, through Times, Countries and Manners, . . . , in AO, 88.

Thomas Holcroft, "Preface to Alwyn; or, The Gentleman Comedian" in AO, 87.

Ibid., 86-88.


Ibid., 67, 68.

Ibid., 423.

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Ibid., 6.

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Ibid., 1.4.6.32.

Ibid., 1.4.11.36.