Although the association between Auerbach’s treatment of the notion of *figura* and Hegel’s concept of *Aufhebung* is well known, it is only by looking at the *figura* outside of this connection, and in identifying what is unique to Auerbach’s conception of it, that the role of figural interpretation in Auerbach’s problematic relationship to the establishment of literary history may be appreciated. This offers Auerbach, as Costa Lima states, ‘an alternative to the sort of factualistic history he had been trained in, as a philologist, and an operational principle that, together with the *Stiltrennung*, would allow him to write an *inner history*—not just an accidental and external one—of literature.’

The second of three meditations on the work of Erich Auerbach included in this Special Issue – the others being “Erich Auerbach: History and Metahistory” (1988) and “Between Realism and Figuration: Auerbach’s decentered realism” (2004) – here Costa Lima reconsiders the relationship between the *figura* and mimesis conceived as the *production of difference*.
AUERBACH AND LITERARY HISTORY

How does Auerbach relate to the tradition of literary history? To answer this question, we must identify five traits in nineteenth-century literary history: (a) the assumption that the passage of time is identical with progress; (b) the loss of the absolute prestige that mathematics had enjoyed since the Renaissance; (c) the inference that positive—that is, nonspeculative, nonmetaphysical, not purely rational—thinking presupposes that there are no interruptions or gaps between the species of entities; (d) the perfect fit, made possible by the idea of representation, between the creative individual, national history, and the general history of civilized nations; (e) the individual as the primary center, his quintessence being genius.

A few comments are in order. The item (a) finds its most complete expression in evolutionism. This desideratum may be scientific or it may be identified with a more "spiritual" yearning, so that literary periods are taken as indicators of progress being diffused through human society. Item (b), which in turn implies less emphasis on the conceptual, focuses more on experiments or the mere cataloging of facts than on the regulated ordering of ideas. Hence the proliferation of literary histories like Sismondi's, in which the author is content to present series of names of authors, dates, and influences, arranged diachronically and according to nationality. The safest way to ensure that one's work was sound was to adopt descriptive neutrality. As to (c), it is important to observe that this belief underlay the preference for causal description. It is not necessary to comment on items (d) and (e). Instead, let me try to answer the question: What were the uses of the sort of literary history I have described?

It might seem strange to say that literary historians seemed to be more concerned with determining what writers represented than with asking historically what literature was considered to be in the period under study, or what specified the literary situation, or what procedures it was made up of. Could it be that, just as biologists do not necessarily have any empathy with the beings they investigate, literary historians left out whatever interest they might have in the literary object? Though Gervinus's statement, "Aesthetic judgements on objects do not concern me, I am neither a poet nor a lover of belles lettres," may be representative of his peers, it would be arbitrary to infer from it that literary history was programmatically anaesthetic. In any case, what is most interesting about this observation is not that it confirms this anaesthesia, but that it was not in opposition to any aestheticizing tendency. Though potentially anaesthetic, literary history was no less aestheticizing for that. As Hayden White observes, apropos of the canon of nineteenth-century historiography in general:

For this tradition, whatever "confusion" is displayed by the historical record is only a surface phenomenon . . . If this confusion is not reducible to the kind of order that a science of laws might impose upon it, it can still be dispelled by historians endowed with the proper kind of understanding. And when this understanding is subjected to analysis, it is always revealed to be of an essentially aesthetic nature.  

Aestheticness depended on the special configuration of a particular object, a literary work, only to the extent that it arose from the fact that the work, as a historical object, made it possible to "prove" the existence of the great chain that made up the world. This was so because aestheticization, promoted by historiography, provided a religious sort of satisfaction that did not require belief in any God. Further, this lay religiousness served the interests of the state, for it affirmed itself through celebration of the degree of civilization reached by societies, as reflected in their respective literatures. In this sense, as David Lloyd demonstrates, literary history had a political mission, justifying, in the case of Matthew Arnold and Samuel Ferguson, British domain over the Irish, which was supposedly beneficial to both the ruler and the ruled. These are the questions I believe should be considered in an examination of the work of Erich Auerbach in literary history. Strictly speaking, Auerbach wrote only two theoretical essays: the "Epilegomena" to Mimesis and the "Introduction: Aim and Method" to his posthumous Literary Language and Its Public in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But in his case it is the very distinction between theoretical and analytical essays that does not hold. Consequently, it is not material that we lack, but rather, to quote from Mimesis's epigraph, "world enough and time." To return to the five traits discussed above, it would be ridiculous even to pose the question whether Auerbach's work had anything to do with an evolutionist tendency. Instead, it would be more profitable to consider (b). Here it must be admitted that in Auerbach the conceptual mode is not particularly valued. The justification for this distaste appears in "Epilegomena": In the history of the spirit (Gestesgeschichte) there is no identity or strict obedience to laws (Gesetzlichkeit); here synthesizing abstract concepts falsify or destroy phenomena. Thus ordering should proceed so as to let phenomena unfold themselves freely.

Auerbach sees this rejection of abstraktzusammenjassende Begriffe as fundamentally important to allow concrete approaches to effect a "historical perspectivism" ("Epilegomena," p. 16). But on close examination, it is clear that this passage contains more than just negatives. For how could perspectivism be achieved unless the position
of the observer were kept constant, so as to establish a viewpoint? Is the observer in question simply the author—that is, the analyst? The passage goes on to clarify: "If it had been possible, I would have avoided all general terms and instead suggested ideas to the reader by the mere presentation of a sequence of passages" ("Epilegomena," p. 17).

In other words, if in the human sciences (Geistesgeschichte) concepts cannot be justified from above, because they are not related to laws that might subsume particular cases, they are displaced to their lowest point: that at which generalization has the sole function of helping to provide the historical placement and the respect of the particularity of each text. We might then say that the subject of Auerbach's historical perspectivism is not as much the analyst as the language.

This inference is borne out when we juxtapose the sentence quoted above to the passage in which Auerbach analyzes Flaubert. Concerning the impersonality of the scenes in Madame Bovary, he writes, "We hear the writer speak; but he expresses no opinion and makes no comment. His role is limited to selecting the events and translating them into language, and this is done in the conviction that every event, if one is able to express it purely and completely, interprets itself and the persons involved far better and more completely than any opinion or judgement appended to it could do." Thus the difference between the critic-historian and the novelist is that the latter can trust language completely, while the former, even if innerly resisting, must resort to the generalizing function of the concept.

When we come to (c), once again the profound difference between Auerbach's work and the Enlightenment paradigm is made plain. As we have seen, the assumption of the "great chain of being" led to the operational prevalence of the mechanism of causality. In both historiography in general and literary history in particular, this prevalence presupposed the determination of a chain of causes from which a necessary constellation of effects derived; the chain was founded on a social—or rather, socionational—situation, and the constellation included author and work. We shall see shortly how Auerbach's practice diverges from this approach.

As to (d) and (e), Auerbach's position is characterized less by divergence than by subtlety, which in turn already follows from what he had elaborated as he positioned himself in relation to (b) and (c).

Let us now turn to Auerbach's interpretive practice. The crucial issue here is made up of the elements "causal explanation," "role of language," and "author's role as historical critic." The first decisive document is given by the opening chapter of Mimesis. As is well known, in this text Auerbach contrasts the Greek experience, represented by Homer, and the Hebrew experience, illustrated by a passage from the Old Testament. Since this is a familiar text, it is not necessary to do more than quote a passage that may be taken as its synthesis: "In the mimetic art of antiquity, the instability of fortune almost always appears as a fate which strikes from without and affects only a limited area, not as fate which results from the inner process of the real, historical world" (Mimesis, p. 29).

The episodes of Odysseus's recognition by his nurse and Isaac's sacrifice represent two radically distinct modes of presentation. In the Greek example, everything is made explicit in the text. The narrator may even delay the action in order to explain in detail an accident—in the example, Odysseus's scar. In the Hebrew text, in contrast, the series of initial questions, culminating in the question why Jehovah orders Abraham to sacrifice his innocent son, are left unanswered. But the examples are not juxtaposed so that the analyst may then affirm or intimate his preference for either of the two modes. If in the Homeric poems man's image is simpler and less problematic, its greater complexity in the biblical text is counterbalanced by its tyrannical claim to truth: "The Bible's claim to truth is not only far more urgent than Homer's, it is tyrannical—it excludes all other claims" (Mimesis, p. 14). Curiously, this passage coincides with Kafka's much earlier remark on the subject, which Auerbach could not possibly have known. However, what in Kafka leads to the predicament of nonchoice, in Auerbach—a completely assimilated Jew—points to a solution, where the idea of figura, grounded in Hegel, is crystallized. But before examining it, let us ask in what sense the example we have chosen belies the mechanism of historical causality. The answer is quite simple: Auerbach does not attempt to submit the difference between the two modes of presentation to a causal explanation. Rather, he suggests that the Hebrew mode is autonomous, not dependent, and it may be inferred that the same is true of the Greek: "The concept of God held by the Jews is less a cause than a symptom of their manner of comprehending and representing things" (Mimesis, p. 8).

Thus the Geistesgeschichte does not explain cause-and-effect relationships. In it, modes of presentation—assuming differentiated ways of constructing a narrative, independent of any sociohistorical causative mechanisms—are seen as able to articulate themselves and adjust to conditioning social factors. To consider them under this second aspect from the outset is in fact to distort them somehow, though to go no further than
the first aspect—that is, independence from sociohistorical mechanisms—would be no less a distortion. Both practices are well known in the intellectual history of the last few centuries: the first is sociologism, the second is idealism. The opening pages of *Mimesis*, then, are the start of an alternative path. What might such a path be like?

As originally expounded, it leads to the notion that the two modes of presentation adapted to the separation of styles, the elevated—tragedy and epic—and the low—comedy and farce. That is: as they find their way into the sociohistorical atmosphere of European history, the two modes interpenetrate. But their differences do not cancel each other out; to say so would be to compromise the effectiveness of the modes of presentation. We need go no further than the chapter I have been discussing to see that such a conclusion would be a misreading of Auerbach. Toward the end of the discussion of Odysseus's scar, the author observes that "with the more profound historicity and the more profound social activity of the Old Testament text, there is connected yet another important distinction from Homer: namely, that a different conception of the elevated style and of the sublime is to be found here." But he also underscores the contrasting ways domestic realism is handled in the two modes: "Domestic realism, the representation of daily life, remains in Homer in the peaceful realm of the idyllic, whereas, from the very first, in the Old Testament stories, the sublime, tragic, and problematic take shape precisely in the domestic and commonplace" (*Mimesis*, p. 22). That is: western history is no melting pot in which everything blurs into an indistinct mass. On the contrary, even if Christianity has merged the two heritages and been carried by the same sociohistorical current as they, differences still remain.

Whereas the primacy of causality in nineteenth-century historiography—and, indeed, in mainstream twentieth-century history—eliminates the sublime, as Hayden White notes, because only a desublimized history could seem to be ruled by laws, in Auerbach the modes of presentation that were seminal for the West are animated on the one hand by the principle of beauty (the Homeric model) and on the other by the principle of the sublime (the Hebrew model). Auerbach confronts them precisely because he believes he can find in western thought the way to separate them while keeping both. Here the influence of Hegel's thought seems to have been decisive.

The association between Auerbach's treatment of the notion of *figura* and Hegel's concept of *Aufhebung* is well known. Rather than focus on the affinity between the two, let us attempt a closer understanding of *figura*.

The concept implies both the prefiguration of something yet to come and the historical preservation of the figuring and figured terms: "*Figura* is something real and historical which announces something else that is also real and historical." Stressing the importance of this notion in early Christian thinkers and the role it plays in the articulation between the Old Testament and the New, Auerbach constantly reiterates the preservation of the historicity between the terms compared. He also adds that it is because this interpretive trend predominates over the spiritualistic, intellectualized, and abstracting one that the idea of *figura*, though quite close to that of allegory, is not to be confused with it: "Since in figural interpretation one thing stands for another, since one thing represents and signifies the other, figural interpretation is ‘allegorical’ in the widest sense. But it differs from most of the allegorical forms known to us by the historicity both of the sign and what it signifies" (*Scenes*, p. 54).

Here we touch on a crucial point. Clearly Auerbach does not simply behave as a scholar who feels he has finished his task once his idea is expressed; it is obvious that this category means much to him because it secularizes and historicizes a principle that had originally served religious exegesis only. Further, it may be that he undertakes its analysis because it offers him both an alternative to the sort of factualistic history he had been trained in, as a philologist, and an operational principle that, together with the *Stiltemnung*, would allow him to write an *inner history*—not just an accidental and external one—of literature. This question cannot be asserted with any certainty. But the long passage below reveals his position, in an ironic, indirect way:

> History, with all its concrete force, remains forever a figure, cloaked and needful of interpretation. In this light the history of no epoch ever has the practical self-sufficiency which, from the standpoint both of primitive man and of modern science, resides in the accomplished fact; all history, rather, remains open and questionable, points to something still concealed, and the tentativeness of events in the figural interpretations is fundamentally different from the tentativeness of events in the modern view of historical development. In the modern view, the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbroken horizontal process; in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from above; events are considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other that is promised and not yet present. Whereas in the modern view the event is always self-sufficient and secure, while the interpretation is fundamentally incomplete, in the figural interpretation the fact is subordinated to an interpretation which is fully secured to begin with: the event is enacted according to an ideal model which is a prototype situated in the future and thus far only
promised. (Scenes, p. 58-59)

Dante, because he actualizes this figurativeness, is for Auerbach the diletto poet par excellence. True, one may read as neutral praise the passage in which he resumes the thesis of his first book, Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt (1929): "For Dante the literal meaning or historical reality of a figure stands in no contradiction to its profounder meaning, but precisely 'figures' it; the historical reality is not annulled, but confirmed and fulfilled by the deeper meaning" (Scenes, p. 73). But we prefer to see Dante as the very epitome of the ideal for the critic-historian. With no such qualifications and much more straightforwardly, Timothy Bahti writes: "Thus, a history of literary secularization is a figural writing of history, a literary history with the accent on the adjective—an allegory of history as its own literalization."

To round off my argument, I will add that to Auerbach the literary dynamics of the West assumes that the separation of styles is slowly corroded by their fusion. While Christianity paved the way for this corrosion to the extent that the Christian principle of equality of all men prevailed over the differentiated treatment of nobles and common people, ironically it was actually achieved outside the scope of Christianity, in nineteenth-century French realism. The crucial texts here are the chapter on Flaubert in Mimesis and Auerbach's later essay on Baudelaire, "Baudelaires Fleurs du mal’ und das Erhabene" (1951). In both cases the transgression of Stilrennung is emphasized. The consequent Stilvermischung actualized by the elevated treatment of a prosaic subject. (The mixture of styles, I might note in passing, achieves what the separation of styles had not been able to do: the breakdown of the separation between the Greek and the Hebrew modes of presentation.) The congruency of the two passages is clear:

The serious treatment of everyday reality, the rise of more extensive and socially inferior human groups to the position of subject matter for problematic-existential representation, on one hand; on the other, the embedding of random persons and events in the general course of contemporary history, the fluid historical background—these, we believe, are the foundations of modern realism. (Mimesis, p. 491)

[Baudelaire] was the first to treat matters as sublime which seemed by nature unsuited to such treatment. The "spleen" of our poem is hopeless despair; it cannot be reduced to concrete causes or remedied in any way. A vulgarian would ridicule it; a moralist or a physician would suggest ways of curing it. But with Baudelaire their efforts would have been vain. (Scenes, p. 208)

However, the effect of this fusion reaches far beyond the literary sphere. For all the admiration he felt for the French realists—"The great French novelists are of fundamental significance for the fundamental issue of Mimesis; my admiration for them is great" (Epikgomena, p. 14)—Auerbach realized that there was something unexpected in them. Once again the comparison between the two essays is highly revealing:

What is true of these two [i.e., Emma and Charles] applies to almost all the other characters in the novel; each of the many mediocre people who act in it has his own world of mediocre and silly stupidity, a world of illusions, habits, instincts, and slogans; each is alone, none can understand another, or help another to insight; there is no common world of men . . . . But what the world would really be, the world of the "intelligent," Flaubert never tells us; in his book the world consists of pure stupidity. (Mimesis, p. 489)

But what then of the hope? How can nothingness be a new sun that will bring flowers to unfolding? I know no answer. There is none to be found in Les Fleurs du mal. (Scenes, p. 223)

Much to his merit, Bahti, relating the essay on Dante to the one on Flaubert, observes that the latter is the culmination of the figura contained in the former, and in this Auerbach's conception of history is revealed: "'History' is literally the past, figuratively its meaning as the history that is thought and written. And this history . . . must always reduce history as an ontological object into a dead letter, so that it might be 'meaningful,' the literal sign for an allegorical meaning." And Bahti did not fail to notice the irony in the promise contained in Dante: "This, then, is the fulfillment of Dante's promise of the history of Western realism: representation without reality or so much as the possibility of life; truth as falsehood and nothingness; characters lacking both fulfillment and prefiguration of 'their own proper reality' except in their figural fulfillment as signifying letters.

Indeed, we may say that both Flaubert and Auerbach, although for different reasons, were aware that they were living a moment of predicament: "Are we far from the return of universal listlessness, the belief in the end of the world, the expectation of a Messiah? But, since the theological basis is missing, what will provide the basis for this enthusiasm that is unaware of itself?" As to Auerbach, since it would be impossible to find a passage as explicit as this, it is necessary to take a more roundabout route. The advantage is that this method may throw
light on the possible limits of his critical and historical vision.

In 1975, David Carroll published a devastating critique of *Mimesis*, showing that for all the author's suspicion of the effectiveness of concepts, there was a theoretical conception underlying his work. If concepts seem to him to *verfälschen oder zerstören die Phaenomene* (falsify or destroy phenomena), it is precisely because, Carroll argued, there is something independent from them "which makes the real predictable and comprehensible." This something, he then added, presupposed "the living, feeling subject," originator of the "relationship with the real," in which "nothing precedes or determines the relationship." In other words, "the self is the concept which guarantees the integrity of the present."\(^{xvii}\)

Carroll's deconstruction was no doubt exemplary. However, less than twenty years later it already begins to seem dated. Not that it is unfair or that the point it raises no longer seems crucial. Why, then, do *Mimesis* and the rest of Auerbach's small output remain alive, even though founded on the same epistemological fallacy? In order to answer this question, let us return to the predicament I mentioned above.

It was because he believed in the constancy of the self, its independence from explanatory constructions, and its power to correct conceptual or ideological distortions that Auerbach had a particular view of mimesis. Schematically, this view presupposes (a) a subject that is potentially a corrector of falsifying views; and (b) "a profound trust in the truthfulness of language," as he wrote apropos of Flaubert. Mimesis was the precipitate of these two assumptions, manifesting itself as the correct and adequate representation of what free eyes were able to see. I should now like to add that the predicament that Auerbach identified in the mid-nineteenth century, specifically incarnated in Flaubert's parody of the fullness promised by the *figura* in Dante, may be better understood if we consider Auerbach's analysis of *Madame Bovary* in *Mimesis*: more precisely, his interpretation of *discours indirect libre* (free indirect style). To Auerbach, its use by Flaubert implied that the novelist left out his own comments, potentially enlightening for the reader, trusting the capacity for enlightenment contained in "the truthfulness of language." "Every event, if one is able to express it purely and completely, interprets itself and the persons involved in it far better and more completely than any opinion or judgement appended to it could do" (*Mimesis*, p. 486).

Today we tend to feel that the interpretation of the procedure achieved much less than it could. As Dominick LaCapra observed, the free indirect style "involves a dialogue not only between self and objectified other but one within the self—a dialogue entailing a high degree of uncertainty and doubt."\(^{xviii}\) That is why the reader cannot be oriented by the narrator. Further, throughout the work the boundaries between individual voices remain fuzzy. Is *Madame Bovary* a critique of French society — postrevolutionary, post-Napoleonic, Restoration, bourgeois, once again imperial? Of course it is. But in the name of what is this society criticized? Now, as long as language lacks confidence in its complete truthfulness — or rather, as long as language no longer enlightens the subject, freeing it from prejudices and distortions — how can mimesis be seen as a faithful homologue, an adequate representation of reality? Might the answer be that mimesis is rather a potential *event* and that, in the strong sense of the term (that in which an event is distinguished from a mere occurrence), it is an incidence that cannot be explained by a previously constituted structure? In contrast with what has been legitimated by an old tradition, mimesis as an event — that is, in its moments of maximum activation — is not homology, and thus not similarity with something previously constituted, but rather the *production of difference*. Thus Flaubert's feeling of being in a predicament was necessary for conditions to allow a reconsideration of mimesis. These conditions, however, were not actualized by Auerbach because he, like the rest of the generation that grew up before World War II, remained committed to the valuation of the individual subject and to the Hegelian legacy of *representation*. We should then be aware of this limit so that we can fruitfully return to his starting point. In doing so, we may well ask: How can his Greek and Hebrew modes of presentation be seen — since they are not to be explained in terms of determination or causality — if not as seminal events?

Auerbach remains precious to us — and even this adjective is insufficient to convey his real worth — in spite of the deconstruction of his humanistic aporia because he is one of the few who allow us to conceive literature in an alternative way. For reasons of limitation of space, I shall do no more than observe that this alternative way allows us to look at mimesis without the anathema that we are used to attaching to it, and refashions its own mode of operation. Mimesis, then — let me repeat — is not a homologue, not *Vorstellung*, but a disruptive event, a producer of difference that affects the way we understand the world.

Translated by Paulo Henrique Brito
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ii However, in a beautiful work, Éloge de la variants: Histoire Critique de la philologie (Paris: Seuil, 1989), Bernard Cerquiglini shows that the distance between the analyst and his object was also wide in the generation of the fathers of Romance philology, who saw the medieval texts they studied as examples of a literary expression that was "au fond . . . un peu infantile et insouciante" (p. 62). For a petite histoire of this generation, which indirectly points to the gap opened between the philologist's scientific ideal and the literary object, see also H. Bloch, "Mieux vaut jan'ais que tard": Romance, Philology, and Old French Letters, Representations 36 (1991): 64-86.


iv We may understand in the same sense a marginal observation of Koselleck's: since Geschichte implied the unicity of the process of time, "increasingly, historical narrative was expected to provide the unity found in the epic derived from the existence of Beginning and End" (R. Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten [1979]; translated by K. Tribe as Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985) p.29.


vi See Erich Auerbach, "Epilegomena zu Mimesis," Romanische Forschungen 65 ½ (1953): 15-16. Further page references to this essay are included in the text.


viii In a letter to Max Brod, Kafka makes a similar comparison between the Greek and Hebrew legacies, and writes that the whole world of the gods was "a great national educational institution, which captured and held men's gaze. It was less profound than the Law of the Jews, but perhaps more democratic" (letter to Max Brod, 7 August 1920, in Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, trans. R. and C. Winston [New York: Schocken, 1977]).


xvii Ibid., p. 143.
